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In the ﬁrst chapter, I quantify the welfare eﬀect of eliminating the
U.S. capital income tax under international ﬁnancial integration. I employ
a two-country, heterogeneous-agent incomplete markets model calibrated to
represent the U.S. and the rest of the world. Short-run and long-run factor
price dynamics are key: after the tax reform, post-tax interest rate increases
less under ﬁnancial openness relative to autarky. Therefore the wealth-rich
households gain less. Post-tax wages also fall less, so the wealth-poor are hurt
less. Hence, the fraction in favor of the reform increases, although the majority
still prefers the status quo. Aggregate welfare eﬀect to the U.S. is a permanent
0.2 % consumption equivalent loss under ﬁnancial openness which is 85.5 %
smaller than the welfare loss under autarky.
The second chapter aims to answer two questions: What helps forecast
U.S. inﬂation? What causes the observed changes in the predictive ability of
vi
variables commonly used in forecasting US inﬂation? In macroeconomic anal-
ysis and inﬂation forecasting, the traditional Phillips curve has been widely
used to exploit the empirical relationship between inﬂation and domestic eco-
nomic activity. Atkeson and Ohanian (2001), among others, cast doubt on the
performance of Phillips curve-based forecasts of U.S. inﬂation relative to naive
forecasts. This indicates a diﬃculty for policy-making and private sectorâs
long term nominal commitments which depend on inﬂation expectations. The
literature suggests globalization may be one reason for this phenomenon. To
test this, we evaluate the forecasting ability of global slack measures under an
open economy Phillips curve. The results are very sensitive to measures of
inﬂation, forecast horizons and estimation samples. We ﬁnd however, terms of
trade gap, measured as HP-ﬁltered terms of trade, is a good and robust vari-
able to forecast U.S. inﬂation. Moreover, our forecasts based on the simulated
data from a workhorse new open economy macro (NOEM) model indicate
that better monetary policy and good luck (i.e. a remarkably benign sample
of economic shocks) can account for the empirical observations on forecasting
accuracy, while globalization plays a secondary role.
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Chapter 1
The Redistributional Consequences of Tax
Reform Under Financial Integration
1.1 Introduction
Should the U.S. capital income tax be eliminated? Capital tax cuts in
general, such as the one introduced by the Bush administration in 2003 and
expected to expire by the end of 2012, have been the subject of intense debate
in both academic and policy circles.1 Supporters of these tax reforms argue
that they promote investment and output, and improve eﬃciency. Opponents,
on the other hand, are concerned with the negative wealth distributional con-
sequences of these reforms. They suggest that a capital tax cut primarily helps
the rich. I contribute to this discussion by incorporating into the analysis the
fact that the U.S. economy has become increasingly integrated with the world
ﬁnancial markets over the past 30 years. Taking as given a realistic wealth
distribution for the U.S. in a heterogeneous agent-incomplete markets frame-
work, I explore how both macroeconomic aggregates and the distribution of
wealth across households respond to replacing the capital income tax with
1The Bush tax reform, known as the Jobs and Growth Tax Relief Reconciliation Act
(JGTRRA), encompasses a cut in both capital gains and dividend taxes. This paper how-
ever, focuses only on capital gains taxes and aims to address a central question in this
literature regarding the elimination of capital income taxes.
1
higher labor income taxes.
Prior work studying the distributional eﬀects of tax reforms has focused
only on closed economy models, which assume that the U.S. households have
no access to international ﬁnancial markets. This assumption is clearly in
conﬂict with reality.2 In fact, the U.S. should be considered as a large open
economy. Therefore, a tax reform of this size can aﬀect the dynamics of world
factor prices and induce large capital inﬂows from abroad. These dynamics in
turn alter the quantitative impact on the wealth redistribution and determine
which households may favor the tax reform. This study is the ﬁrst attempt
in the literature to quantify the desirability of capital income tax reforms in
which the U.S. is modelled as part of a ﬁnancially integrated global economy.
Following Chamley (1986) and Judd (1985), a main ﬁnding in the Ram-
sey literature is that in the standard neoclassical growth model it is not optimal
to tax capital in the long run. In a similar framework, a related policy prescrip-
tion by Lucas (1990) was that if the highly distortionary capital income tax
were to be replaced by a higher (and less distortionary) labor income tax in the
U.S., households could enjoy signiﬁcant welfare gains (a 1 percent increase in
annual consumption) as the capital income tax cut stimulates investment, out-
put and consumption.3 While the elimination of the capital income tax seems
2The U.S. net foreign asset position reached −17% of its GDP in 2007, while the current
account deﬁcit reached 5.1%. Source: Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2007) and World Develop-
ment Indicators.
3As Lucas put it, the welfare gain is twice that of eliminating 10% inﬂation, and about
20 times that of eliminating the business cycle.
2
attractive in these closed economy models, it becomes even more attractive
in a ﬁnancially open economy since capital inﬂows from abroad amplify the
stimulus to investment and output and enable greater consumption smooth-
ing during the transition period. Mendoza and Tesar (1998) pointed out the
importance of the international borrowing channel, in a two-country represen-
tative agent model. In such a setting, the elimination of the capital income
tax led to welfare gains to the U.S. up to 33% more than in a closed economy
model.
My model economy preserves these economy-wide long run potential
gains from eliminating the capital income tax. However, the government's
need to increase other taxes, such as the labor income tax, in order to main-
tain ﬁscal solvency has adverse wealth distributional eﬀects. In particular, the
tax reform may be opposed by households who hold low levels of assets and
rely predominantly on labor income; while supported by wealthy households
who receive proportionally more capital income. Indeed, Domeij and Heath-
cote (2004) quantitatively showed that in a closed economy, given the highly
concentrated U.S. wealth distribution, the elimination of the capital income
tax would not be supported by the majority of the population. I argue that in
order to make a more realistic assessment of the desirability of a tax reform,
the U.S. should be modelled as an open economy.
The importance of looking at the problem under ﬁnancial openness
can be understood through the following mechanism. A capital income tax
cut increases the demand for capital by the production sector, raising both
3
the equilibrium capital stock and the after-tax interest rate in the economy.
While this also implies a rise in wages, after-tax wages decline since the capital
income tax cut is accompanied by a suﬃciently higher labor income tax. The
qualitative properties of this mechanism are common to both closed economy
and large open economy models, but the quantitative eﬀects diﬀer. In a two-
country setting, the policy-induced increase in the return to capital leads to
an inﬂow of capital from the rest of the world. As a result, interest rates
increase by less than under autarky. Hence, the gains to rich households
are smaller.4 In addition, the more rapid accumulation of capital raises the
marginal product of labor relative to autarky, thereby mitigating the decline
in after-tax wages. This implies that poor households are not hurt by the
reform as much as a closed economy model would predict. This motivates
the question of the current paper: are these quantitative changes in wage and
interest rate dynamics under ﬁnancial openness sharp enough that a majority
will support the tax reform?
To answer this question, I employ a two-country version of the Aiyagari
(1994) model where the two countries are calibrated to represent the U.S. and
the rest of the world (ROW).5 The framework is related to the heterogeneous-
agent incomplete markets models ﬁrst analyzed by Bewley (1986), mrohoro§lu
(1989), Huggett (1993), as well as Aiyagari (1994) which is a one-sector neo-
4Throughout the text, `rich' and `poor' are used interchangeably for `wealth-rich' and
`wealth-poor', respectively, unless stated otherwise.
5ROW represents Euro Area, Japan, oil exporters and emerging Asia. A list of the
countries are given in the appendix.
4
classical growth model with uninsurable idiosyncratic labor income risk and
borrowing constraints.6 I further enhance the model by including government
policy. In this setting, I conduct an experiment à la Lucas (1990) by introduc-
ing a unilateral, unanticipated and permanent capital income tax cut in the
U.S.7 To ﬁnance a ﬁxed stream of government expenditures, both countries
adjust their labor income taxes such that the present value of the government
budget holds. The U.S. economy is simulated both under ﬁnancial autarky and
ﬁnancial integration, and the consequences of the reform are evaluated taking
into account both steady state gains and the transitional dynamics. In partic-
ular, households with various initial wealth and labor productivity levels are
tracked over time after the reform takes place, and their welfare is compared
to the status quo. The calibration of the benchmark model of ﬁnancial open-
ness is realistic in the sense that at the initial steady state equilibrium both
macroeconomic aggregates and asset holdings across diﬀerent wealth groups
in the U.S. match the data closely.
I show that ﬁnancial openness plays a key role in mitigating the adverse
redistributional eﬀects of the tax reform. For instance, households that are at
the top 1% of the U.S. wealth distribution prior to the reform enjoy around
a permanent 12% consumption equivalent gain under ﬁnancial autarky, while
this number is reduced to 6% under ﬁnancial integration. On the other hand,
6This class of models has become the standard workhorse approach in investigating the
relationship between macroeconomic phenomena and their distributional consequences.
7See Aiyagari and McGrattan (1998), Flodén (2001), Domeij and Heathcote (1994) and
Röhrs and Winter (2011) for examples of ﬁscal policy reforms in a heterogeneous agent-
incomplete markets framework.
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households at the bottom 1% of the wealth distribution are estimated to suﬀer
a permanent 5% consumption equivalent loss under ﬁnancial autarky, while
the loss shrinks to 1.8% under ﬁnancial integration. Moreover, the fraction
of the population with positive welfare gains is estimated as 3% larger under
ﬁnancial openness than under ﬁnancial autarky, with about 29% of the U.S.
households in favor of the reform.8 Hence there is not a majority to support
a capital income tax cut when ﬁnancial openness is taken into account.
A second result is that the aggregate welfare gain to the economy due to
the elimination of capital tax is negative, although this welfare loss is not too
large: a permanent 0.24% loss in consumption. The closed economy predicts a
permanent 1.55% decline in consumption, implying a cost that is 6.5 times the
cost in an open economy. In both model economies, a tax cut yields steady
state gains but, perhaps surprisingly, the steady state gain under ﬁnancial
openness is lower. This is because in the long run, households service the
foreign debt accumulated during the transition, thereby sacriﬁcing some of
their consumption in the new steady state. Nevertheless, the transition to
the new steady state is less costly for the open economy since international
borrowing makes the transition path of aggregate consumption smoother.
The aggregate welfare result is in line with the literature studying cap-
ital taxation under incomplete asset markets characterized by uninsured id-
iosyncratic risk and borrowing constraints. Domeij and Heathcote (2004) ﬁnd
8According to U.S. Census Bureau data (July 2012), this diﬀerence corresponds to
roughly 9.9 million people on average.
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a negative result. Ábrahám and Cárceles-Poveda (2009) report similar re-
sults studying tax reforms with endogenous borrowing constraints and ﬂat
rate taxes.
For a closed economy and in the presence of precautionary savings mo-
tive, Aiyagari (1995) suggests that households accumulate too much capital so
that taxing capital helps bring the capital stock to the optimum level. There-
fore, a positive capital income tax is optimal in the long run. mrohoro§lu
(1998) and Conesa, Kitao and Krueger (2009) study tax reforms in life cycle
models when households are uninsured against idiosyncratic labor income risk
and face borrowing constraints. In these environments, replacing the capital
income tax by a higher labor income tax imposes greater burden on agents
when they are younger and liquidity constrained, reducing their ability to
smooth consumption. They also quantitatively characterize the optimal capi-
tal tax rate and ﬁnd that a positive tax is optimal. It is still an open question
what the optimal capital income tax should be when we move away from ﬁ-
nancial autarky. However, characterizing the optimal capital income tax is
beyond the scope of this paper and left as future work.
In open economy models, domestic tax policy has been shown to have
eﬀects on other countries' tax policies. Klein, Quadrini and Ríos-Rull (2005)
and Quadrini (2005) analyze tax policy when governments conduct optimal ﬁs-
cal policy without commitment under international mobility of capital. Men-
doza and Tesar (2004) evaluate the European tax competition in a two-country
neoclassical growth model. In the current paper, the ROW labor income tax
7
needs to be altered in response to an elimination of the U.S. capital income
tax. Since the elimination of the U.S. capital income tax does not create gains
for the majority of the population, the reform is not desirable to implement.
Hence, for this particular reform, we do not mention any need for the ROW
government to give a strategic response by altering the ROW capital income
tax.
This study is also related to two papers by Mendoza, Quadrini and
Ríos-Rull (2007; 2009). In a two-country heterogeneous-agent model, they
depict how global ﬁnancial imbalances have emerged as well as quantifying
the welfare eﬀects of ﬁnancial integration (Mendoza, Quadrini and Ríos-Rull
(2007)). The current framework is complementary to this strand of the litera-
ture in two dimensions. First, it explains how a capital tax cut may deteriorate
the U.S. net foreign asset and current account imbalances. In this case, in-
creasing the capital taxes, rather than decreasing, may help prevent the global
ﬁnancial imbalances from reaching unsustainably high levels. Second, the cur-
rent paper helps us understand how tax policy may mitigate or exacerbate the
negative redistributional consequences of ﬁnancial globalization through wage
and interest rate dynamics.
I proceed with the model in the next section. In section 3, I discuss
the long run equilibrium eﬀects of a capital income tax cut and explain the
numerical solution as well as the calibration strategy. Section 4 provides the
results and section 5 concludes.
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1.2 The Model
I introduce a two-country heterogeneous-agent, incomplete markets
model. There are two ﬁnancially integrated countries in the world economy,
Home and Foreign. Foreign variables are denoted by an asterisk (*). For con-
venience, the model is presented for Home only and Foreign variables are
introduced when needed.
1.2.1 Production sector
In each country, aggregate output Yt is produced by a representative
ﬁrm using aggregate capitalKt, and aggregate laborN, according to a constant
returns to scale production function:9
Yt = F (Kt, N) (1.1)
Capital depreciates at the rate δ ∈ (0, 1). All parameters of produc-
tion are the same across countries. In each country, households competitively
supply physical capital to the ﬁrms at a real rental rate rkt and labor (inelas-
tically) at a real wage rate wt where both factors are assumed to be immobile
internationally. Perfect competition in factor markets implies ﬁrms make zero
proﬁts in equilibrium.
9Following the literature, all aggregate variables are denoted by capital letters.
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1.2.2 Government
The government in each country collects tax revenues from labor and
equity and issues debt Dt+1 at each period t to ﬁnance an exogenous stream
of real per capita government expenditures, G. The real one period return
to government debt is risk-free and equal to rdt . In contrast to private debt,
public debt is assumed not to be traded internationally as there would not be
a well-deﬁned portfolio choice between the two assets. The government does
not make any transfers. At t = 0, the government introduces a tax reform so
that a new pair of taxes τn and τ k are imposed. The date−t budget constraint
for each government is as follows:
G+ rdtDt = Dt+1 −Dt +Nwtτn +Kt(rkt − δ)τ k (1.2)
G∗ + rd∗t D
∗
t = D
∗
t+1 −D∗t +N∗w∗t τn∗ +K∗t (rk∗t − δ)τ k∗ (1.3)
given D0 and D∗0
1.2.3 Households
Each country is inhabited by a continuum of unit mass of households
which receive shocks to labor eﬃciency, εt ∈ E which are i.i.d. across house-
holds and persistent over time. This is the only uncertainty in the model.
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Household choices in period t are made after observing εt. A household receiv-
ing a shock εt earns a labor income εtnwt. The eﬃciency shock εt evolves over
time according to a m-state (m <∞) ﬁrst-order Markov process deﬁned with
anm×m transition probability matrix Π = [piij], where piij = Pr(εt+1 = εj|εt =
εi). All elements of Π are non-negative and each row sums up to 1. I denote
the ﬁnite history of these shocks from date 0 up to date t by εt = {ε0, ..., εt}.
To denote the probability distribution over E at any period t, I use the vector
pt ∈ Rm. Initial distribution is denoted by p0 and the date−t distribution is
then given by pt = p0Πt. E has a unique ergodic set, no cyclically moving sub-
sets and for any given p0, {pt}∞t=0 converges to the (unique) limit p∗. I start by
assuming p0 = p∗, therefore the aggregate eﬀective labor supply N converges
to a constant.
Households maximize their expected life-time utility given by
E0
[ ∞∑
t=0
βtU(ct)
]
(1.4)
where β ∈ (0, 1) is the discount rate. The period utility function U(·) is strictly
increasing, strictly concave and continuously diﬀerentiable. In each period, a
household's consumption is denoted by ct and hours worked by n. I assume a
single composite consumption good, traded across countries.
Households face the following budget constraint taking as given the
relative prices and tax rates at each period
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ct + bt+1 + dt+1 + kt+1︸ ︷︷ ︸ ≤ εtnwt(1− τn) + [(rkt − δ)(1− τ k) + 1]kt + (1 + rdt )dt + (1 + rt)bt︸ ︷︷ ︸
≡ at+1 ≡ (1 + rt)at
Household expenditures are given on the left-hand side of the budget
constraint. Accordingly, they may purchase consumption goods ct and borrow
or lend in the amount of their asset holdings, at+1. Speciﬁcally, households
may invest in either 1-period, non-state-contingent private bonds, bt+1 which
are internationally traded at an interest rate rt, non-state-contingent public
bonds dt+1, which are traded only domestically at an interest rate rdt or capital
goods, kt+1. The right-hand side of the budget constraint includes factor and
non-factor income of the household. Households' after-tax labor income is
given by εtnwt(1 − τn) where τn ∈ [0, 1] is a constant, ﬂat-rate labor income
tax. A ﬂat-rate, constant tax rate τ k ∈ [0, 1] is also imposed on households'
net return from physical capital and therefore physical capital has an after-tax
return of 1 + (rkt − δ)(1 − τ k) . Both tax rates may diﬀer across countries.
Finally, private bond holdings yield an income equal to (1 + rt)bt and public
debt holdings yield (1 + rdt )dt. Notice that optimal portfolio allocation implies
rt = r
d
t = (r
k
t − δ)(1− τ k) (1.5)
Hence, the international return on private bonds is equal to the net-
of-tax return on physical capital at each period. Since the model assumes no
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aggregate TFP shocks and the real one-period return from private and public
debt are guaranteed (assuming that there is no default on private or public debt
in any countries) all three assets are considered perfect substitutes. Therefore,
we are able to state the household's problem without considering the portfolio
composition of assets. The budget constraint can now be re-written as
ct + at+1 ≤ εtnwt(1− τn) + (1 + rt)at (1.6)
In each period, individuals are able to borrow up to an exogenous limit,
denoted by a
	
. Therefore at any period t :
at ≥ a
	
. (1.7)
The borrowing constraint is the same for all individuals in a country
and the same across countries. When households face a borrowing constraint,
this implies that a household can have a long position in one type of asset while
having a short position in another to the extent that the net asset position
does not fall below the limit.
Deﬁne st = (at, εt) as the state vector of the household at any t. Given
the deterministic sequences of factor prices {wt, rkt , rdt , rt}∞τ=0 , a constant level
of taxes and government expenditures {τn, τ k, G} and initial conditions s0 =
(a0, ε0) in any country, a household maximizes (4), subject to (6) and (7).
The resource constraint in Home is given by (and similarly deﬁned for
Foreign)
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Ct + It +G+Bt+1 −Bt = Yt + rtBt (1.8)
where It ≡ Kt+1 − (1 − δ)Kt is net domestic, private investment and
Bt ≡ At − Kt − Dt is the date−t net foreign asset position for Home and
B0, K0 and D0 given. We similarly deﬁne the net foreign asset position for
Foreign, B∗t ≡ A∗t − K∗t − D∗t and take B∗0 , K∗0 and D∗0 as given. Having
deﬁned the net foreign asset position, we can also deﬁne the Home current
account, CAt ≡ Bt+1 − Bt, net exports, NXt ≡ Bt+1 − Bt(1 + rt) and net
factor payments, NFPt ≡ rtBt which can be similarly deﬁned for Foreign.
1.2.4 Equilibrium
Let A be the set of the possible values of household wealth (set of
endogenous states). Since households are allowed to borrow up to an exogenous
(negative) limit, a
	
, A = [a
	
,∞]. Let (A,A) and (E, E) be measurable spaces
where A denotes the Borel set that are subsets of A and E is the set of all
subsets of E. Let (S,S) = (A×E,A×E) be the product space and S is the set of
all possible household states. The solution to the household's problem provides
the decision rules for consumption, ct = hc(at, εt) and asset holdings, at+1 =
ha(at, εt) given the initial conditions (a0, ε0) and if the history of idiosyncratic
shocks up to t is εt . These rules determine the evolution of the distribution
of agents over st. I deﬁne the joint distribution of households across both
household wealth and labor eﬃciency at date t by Γt(at, εt). A household with
the state st will have a state vector lying in St+1 next period, given this period's
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distribution Γt(at, εt) and the decision rules hc(at, εt) and ha(at, εt). Given
Γ0(a0, ε0), the distribution evolves with the law of motion deﬁned by
Γt+1(at+1, εt+1) =
∑
ε
Π(εt+1|εt)Γt(h−1a (at+1, εt), εt) (1.9)
The deﬁnition of competitive equilibrium under ﬁnancial integration is
given below.
Deﬁnition 1 (Financial integration) Initial joint distributions of indi-
viduals across both individual wealth and labor eﬃciency shocks in the two
economies are given by Γ0(a0, ε0) and Γ
∗
0(a
∗
0, ε
∗
0). Idiosyncratic risk washes out
in aggregate. Given initial distributions, net foreign asset positions, B0, B
∗
0 ,
public debt D0, D
∗
0 , capital stock K0, K
∗
0 , ﬁscal policy instruments {G,G∗, τn, τn∗, τ k, τ k∗},
a general equilibrium under ﬁnancial integration is deﬁned by
1. Households' policy functions {hc(st), h∗c(st), ha(st), h∗a(st)}∞t=0
2. A competitively determined, deterministic path of relative prices {wt, w∗t , rdt , rd∗t ,
rkt , r
k∗
t , rt}∞t=0
3. A deterministic path of macroeconomic aggregates {Ct, C∗t , At+1, A∗t+1Kt+1, K∗t+1,
Bt+1, B
∗
t+1, Dt+1, D
∗
t+1}∞t=0
4. Distributions {Γt(at, εt),Γ∗t (a∗t , εt)}∞t=1
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such that:
• Given the sequences of plans and policies, the plans are optimal for
individuals and ﬁrms (as described below).
• The aggregates are consistent with household behavior:∫
s
ct(st)dΓt = Ct,
∫
s
at(st−1)dΓt = At, for all t. (1.10)
∫
s
c∗t (st)dΓ
∗
t = C
∗
t ,
∫
s
a∗t (st−1)dΓ
∗
t = A
∗
t , for all t. (1.11)
• Labor markets clear domestically:∫
s
εtndΓt = N and
∫
s
εtn
∗dΓ∗t = N
∗, (1.12)
• Goods market clears:
Ct + C
∗
t + It + I
∗
t +G+G
∗ = F (Kt, N) + F (K∗t , N
∗), for all t. (1.13)
• Asset market clears:
Bt +B
∗
t = 0, for all t. (1.14)
• The government budget holds in each country for all t.
• The sequence of distributions Γt, Γ∗t is consistent with the initial distri-
bution, individual policies and idiosyncratic shocks for t ≥ 1.
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1.2.5 Characterizing the equilibrium
The ﬁrst order conditions from the optimization problems above are
given below.
1. Firm's optimization:
rkt = FK(Kt, N) (1.15)
wt = FN(Kt, N) (1.16)
The conditions for Foreign can be deﬁned similarly. Hence factor prices in a
given country depend on the aggregate capital and labor in that country.
2. Household's optimization:
Uc(st) = βEεt+1|εt(1 + rt+1)[Uc(st+1) + λ˜(st+1)] (1.17)
where and λ˜ is the Lagrange multiplier associated with the borrowing con-
straint. Again, similar conditions are deﬁned for Foreign.
1.3 The tax reform
The tax reform occurs at t = 0, when the world economy is in the
steady state. The Home government introduces a permanent, unanticipated
capital income tax cut, and increases the labor income tax to compensate the
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lost revenue. The reform is transmitted to Foreign, requiring a change in the
labor tax to maintain ﬁscal solvency. Hence, Foreign introduces the tax reform
at t = 0.
In this section, I provide some intuition for how tax reforms aﬀect the
steady-state allocations and how these results compare to those of a closed
economy. I start with explaining how the international interest rate is deter-
mined in the steady state.10 Assume that the production function is deﬁned
as Cobb-Douglas, KαN1−α where α is the share of capital in production and
also assume a general case in which labor supply is elastic.
Optimal portfolio choice in addition to ﬁrm's optimization implies that
in the US after-tax net return to capital is equal to the interest rate:
(rk − δ)(1− τk) = (αKα−1N1−α − δ)(1− τk) = r (1.18)
and similarly in Foreign:
(rk∗ − δ)(1− τ ∗k ) = (αK∗α−1N∗1−α − δ)(1− τ ∗k ) = r (1.19)
If there exists an equilibrium with ﬁnancial integration, these two con-
ditions must yield:
r = (αKα−1N1−α − δ)(1− τk) = (αK∗α−1N∗1−α − δ)(1− τ ∗k ) (1.20)
10A closed economy version of a similar analysis can be found in Aiyagari (1995).
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Therefore, after-tax net returns to physical capital are equalized across
countries under ﬁnancial integration. If an equilibrium with τk 6= τ ∗k exists,
this implies cross-country diﬀerences in aggregate equity and employment. In
particular, if τk < τ ∗k , aggregate capital-aggregate labor ratio in Home is greater
than Foreign, i.e. K/N > K∗/N∗. Notice that if physical capital were traded
internationally and households paid taxes according to the resident principle
then optimality would require that cross-country capital income tax rates be
equalized, τk = τ ∗k .
11
Moreover, government's steady-state budget constraint can be expressed
as follows:
K +D =
K
1− τk +
τnwN −G
r
(1.21)
and
K∗ +D∗ =
K∗
1− τ ∗k
+
τ ∗nw
∗N∗ −G∗
r
(1.22)
For a given set of tax rates and government expenditures, the K + D
11The resident principle requires that Home's households are imposed with the same tax
rate for their domestic and foreign capital holdings. If equity were traded internationally and
under the resident principle, the optimal portfolio allocation for Home residents would imply
r = (αKα−1N1−α−δ)(1−τk) = (αK∗α−1N∗1−α−δ)(1−τk) where K = K1+K2 is the total
domestic equity, K1 is the (aggregate) domestic equity holding of Home residents and K2 is
the (aggregate) domestic equity holding of Foreign residents. A similar condition for Foreign
residents can be stated as r = (αKα−1N1−α − δ)(1 − τ∗k ) = (αK∗α−1N∗1−α − δ)(1 − τ∗k )
where total foreign equity can be deﬁned similarly, K∗ = K∗1 + K
∗
2 . In this case, cross-
country capital tax rates would be equalized. Note also that even if countries diﬀered in
terms of TFP parameters this result would not change.
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curve is decreasing in r for both countries. This is because as r rises, rk rises
and w falls. This implies lowerK/N and lower N . Hence, K is also lower. This
is similar for Foreign. As r →∞, K, N and w → 0. On the other hand, if r →
0, then K, N and w →∞. Supply of assets are determined by the household's
problem and as deﬁned above, aggregate household savings in each country are
given by
∫
s
adΓ = A and
∫
s
a∗dΓ∗ = A∗. As shown by Aiyagari (1994; 1995),
A is an increasing function of r (which follows from the fact that household
policy functions are increasing in r for each country. The equations (20)-(22)
along with households' aggregate savings determine the equilibrium in the
world asset market. Furthermore, under market incompleteness, aggregate
asset holdings tend to inﬁnity as r approaches the rate of time preference,
1/β− 1 from below. As discussed by Aiyagari (1994;1995), a household wants
to maintain a smooth marginal utility of consumption when r = 1/β − 1.
When households face uninsurable labor income risk, however, the possibility
of having bad income shocks in the future requires households to accumulate
inﬁnite amount of assets in order to maintain a smooth marginal utility of
consumption proﬁle.
An equilibrium with ﬁnancial integration exists if there exists a steady
state interest rate r such that
A(r)−K −D + A∗(r)−K∗ −D∗ = 0 (1.23)
i.e. if the global asset market clears.
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When countries are symmetric, i.e. if they have identical sets of tax
rates and government spending, there exists an equilibrium with balanced
trade (or zero net foreign asset position), i.e.
B(r) = A(r)−K −D = 0 (1.24)
and
B∗(r) = A∗(r)−K∗ −D∗ = 0 (1.25)
which yields asset market clearing at the global level
B(r) +B∗(r) = 0. (1.26)
This is the case where asset demand and supply curves of the two countries
are on top of each other, similar to the autarky case. In a more realistic case,
assume that the two countries apply diﬀerent capital income taxes and say
capital income tax in Home, τk is lower. This implies the asset demand curve
for Home, K +D lies to the right of the asset demand curve for Foreign. The
logic is as follows. For a given world interest rate r, if τk is lower rk is lower
and K/N ratio is higher (See equation (21); similar logic applies to Foreign
by equation (22); which implies w is higher and hence N is higher. Higher
N implies K is higher. For the sake of simplicity and to highlight the eﬀects
of ﬁscal policy, I assume that the initial conditions of the two countries are
diﬀerent only due to the diﬀerences in ﬁscal policy parameters. Hence I assume
21
that Home has a lower capital income tax in the pre-reform steady state.This
implies that from the comparative static analysis above, the K +D curve for
Home lies to the right of the K∗ + D∗ curve of Foreign, i.e. the steady-state
capital stock in Home is higher due to the lower capital income tax rate.
As a result, there is excess supply of capital in Home and excess demand
for capital in Foreign yielding a negative foreign asset position for Home and
a positive foreign asset position for Foreign at the equilibrium interest rate,
i.e. for a given world interest rate r,
B(r) = A(r)−K −D < 0 (1.27)
and
B∗(r) = A∗(r)−K∗ −D∗ > 0. (1.28)
Therefore, in my model, the global net foreign asset imbalances is
mainly a consequence of the cross-country capital tax diﬀerences.12 Cross-
country diﬀerences in labor income taxes, government expenditures, or public
debt stock also cause shifts in these curves and most importantly, the asset
supply curves do not necessarily overlap. But as shown in the next section,
the properties of the initial steady state equilibrium are qualitatively similar
to those mentioned here.
Removing the capital income tax in Home implies that Home (Foreign)
increases (decreases) its capital stock, Home's (Foreign's) net foreign asset
12In Mendoza et al. (2007) for example, global imbalances are modeled as a result of
heterogeneity of countries in the degree of their market incompleteness, which is reﬂected
in the cross-country diﬀerences between household borrowing constraints.
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position deteriorates (improves) and the world interest rate rises due to Home
tax reform. By the following condition for steady-state aggregate employment
from equation (20) above, higher capital stock K implies higher aggregate
employment N in the steady state. Higher N in Home implies higher output.
Foreign, on the other hand, suﬀers a loss of capital stock, lower hours worked
and lower output. However, a quantitative experiment is required to see how
the government debt stock evolves and the new labor income tax is determined
in response to a capital tax cut. In this framework, the post-reform steady state
equilibrium allocations are solved simultaneously with the transition path. The
next section explains these dynamics in detail.
1.3.1 Numerical solution and calibration
Since the model involves inequality constraints, local approximation
techniques are not appropriate to approach the problem at hand. I use a
technique called the endogenous grid point method by Carroll (2006), blending
the time-iteration method by Coleman (1990) and policy function iteration.13
I solve the pre and post-tax reform steady states as well as the transitional
path based on the endogenous grid point method.
Assuming the post-tax steady state is converged at time T, the post-
13Time iteration is a convenient method that can deal with inequality constraints eas-
ily. It also relies on interpolation techniques and therefore preserves the continuity of the
state space. Coleman (1990) suggests using a root-ﬁnding algorithm (a variant of Newton's
method) to solve for the decision rules which requires a lot of computing time. Carroll (2006)
however, provides a faster method that avoids a nonlinear equation solver. In particular,
we only compute the expected marginal utility in the Euler equation and then solve for the
current period's consumption algebraically.
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reform steady state can be computed once the levels of public debt, DT andD∗T
are known. These however, depend on their values in the transition, therefore
the ﬁnal steady state and the transition need to be computed simultaneously.
First, the pre-reform steady state is computed. Then the post-reform steady
state and the transition are computed based on a variant of shooting algorithm.
Once the paths of government debt are known for each country, the post-
reform labor income tax rates are determined endogenously. In addition, the
parameters of government expenditures are determined endogenously. The
details of the solution technique are provided in the appendix.
I calibrate the model to match the US and ROW macroeconomic ag-
gregates and wealth distribution (only for the US). ROW consists of Japan,
Euro Area, Emerging Asia and Oil Exporting Countries (A complete list of
the countries can be found in the appendix). The number of targets to be
matched is high compared to the existing literature, and there is little room in
the model to match both the aggregates and the distributions. Despite these
challenges, the current parameterization is able to match the targets to a great
extent.
Preferences and Technology: Benchmark model parameterization is
summarized in Table 1.1 below. Accordingly, capital's share in output is 0.36,
and the depreciation rate is 0.06. I assume a CRRA utility function with the
coeﬃcient of risk aversion is 1, implying log utility. The discount rate is set
at 0.965 and the resulting steady state capital-output ratio is 3.40 for the US
and 3.27 for the ROW.
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Model Data
US (FI) ROW (FI) US
Wealth Gini (Pre-reform) 0.76 0.76 0.78
Asset holding distribution
Top 1% 11.30% 11.31% 29.6%
Top 10 % 59.48% 58.41% 66.1%
Top 20 % 82.52% 81.58% 79.5%
Bottom 40 % 1.43% 1.10% 1.33%
Table 1.1: Distributional properties of the pre-reform steady-state
Borrowing limits: I set them in each country at a
	
= 0, hence households
are not allowed to borrow.14
Labor productivity process: These are taken from Domeij and Heathcote
(2004) where it is assumed that there are three productivity shock levels,
E = {εh, εm, εl} with εh = 4.74, εm = 0.847 and εl = 0.170, and identical in
both countries. The transition probabilities are given by
Π =
 Π11 1− Π11 01−Π22
2
Π22
1−Π22
2
0 Π11 1− Π11
=
 0.90 0.10 00.005 0.99 0.005
0 0.10 0.90

This parameterization yields an endogenous wealth distribution that matches
the overall wealth inequality, the Gini coeﬃcient closely in the data (1992).
In the model, the poorest 40% of the U.S. households (under ﬁnancial
integration) hold 1.43% of total wealth and the richest 10% hold 59.48%. As
we move towards the right-end of the asset distribution however, the model is
14While this is a standard assumption in the literature, I will present results with negative
borrowing limits in the next draft.
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less able to match the data. However, since it is the wealth-poor households
that are most likely to suﬀer from the reform, matching the left-tail of the asset
distribution closely is suﬃcient to determine the fraction in favor of the reform.
On the other hand, since the asset holdings of the rich are underestimated,
the potential aggregate welfare gains of the tax reform are underestimated, as
well. Since a household will support the reform as long as the household's gain
is positive, the relatively weak estimation of the right-tail of the distribution
does not aﬀect the analysis on the desirability of the tax reform.
Government policy: I set the U.S. capital and labor income tax at 39.7%
and 26.9%, respectively, following Domeij and Heathcote (2004) where they
report the average tax rates for the period 1990-1996, based on the method-
ology of Mendoza, Razin and Tesar (1998).15 Since these estimates are based
on OECD data, the tax estimates are unavailable for many countries in the
ROW and calculated only for G7 countries. If I restrict the set of countries to
G7, however, the resulting allocations are unable to capture macroeconomic
aggregates in the data, especially the U.S. external debt position.16 Therefore,
I set the labor and capital tax rates for the ROW in order to match the global
ﬁnancial imbalances. The capital income tax rate for the ROW is 45% and
the labor income tax rate is 22%. Another way of interpreting these taxes is
that the institutional imperfections in the ROW are reﬂected as a wedge on
15Landry (2011) updated these estimates for 2009, and the capital and labor income tax
for the US are 38% and 22.3%, respectively. I will update my calculations based on the
recent estimates in the next draft.
16The major foreign holders of U.S. treasury securities in 2012 include Japan, China,
emerging Asian countries and oil exporters.
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Technology, preferences α β δ σ a
	
& borrowing limit 0.36 0.965 0.06 1 0
Fiscal policy D/Y D∗/Y ∗ τ k τ k∗ τn τn∗
0.66 0.60 0.397 0.45 0.269 0.22
Table 1.2: Parameters in the pre-reform steady state
capital and labor returns.17 I set D0 and D∗0 to match the US and ROW public
debt-to-GDP ratio (which also determines the government spending-to-GDP
ratio, given the tax rates.) These values match the data closely.
The model yields the net foreign asset-to-GDP ratio for the US as
−19.5%, which is close to the data reported by Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2007).
These values range between −16% and −20% during 2004-2007. For ROW,
the model yields the NFA-to-world GDP ratio of 9.87% which is close to 9.5%
observed in 2006. Public debt-to-GDP ratio for the US is 66% while for the
ROW is 60%. For the U.S. in 2009, this value was 67% (Central Government
Debt from World Development Indicators). For the ROW, the data are not
reported for several countries and the average public debt-to-GDP ratio is
59% in 2009 for the remaining set of countries. The government spending-to-
GDP ratio for the US and ROW is 21.6% and 19.3%, respectively. In 2009,
these were 17.5% and 18.8% (average) respectively (Central Government Final
Consumption Expenditure from World Development Indicators).
17See Caselli and Feyrer (2009) and Chen, Imrohoroglu and Imrohoroglu (2009) for similar
interpretations.
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Financial integration Financial Autarky
US ROW US
Initial Final Initial Final Initial Final
Capital income tax 0.397 0.00 0.45 0.45 0.397 0.00
Labor income tax 0.269 0.34 0.21 0.22 0.269 0.35
Table 1.3: Tax rates in the pre- and post-reform steady-states
1.4 Results
1.4.1 Macroeconomic consequences of tax reform
I ﬁrst present the impact of the tax reform on macroeconomic aggre-
gates. When the world economy is in the steady-state, the U.S. capital income
tax is replaced by a higher labor income tax. The reform is permanent and
unanticipated. The ROW labor income tax also increases in order to recover
the loss in tax revenues. The resulting labor income tax rates in the model
economies are given in Table 1.3 below.
Figure 1.1 presents the dynamics of economy-wide variables. Consump-
tion, capital and output are given in terms of percentage changes relative to
the initial steady state, while all other variables are deﬁned relative to output
and therefore their percentage point deviations from the initial steady state
are plotted.
The macroeconomic eﬀects of the reform in an open economy diﬀers
from the closed economy in three main dimensions: i) long run gains, ii) short
run costs, and iii) adjustment in labor income taxes.
28
i) Long run and ii) short run: The reform stimulates investment and
output in the long run in the U.S., and international borrowing enables the
rise in these two variables to be greater relative to autarky. The reform also
requires U.S. households to sacriﬁce some of their consumption in the short
run: we observe a drastic fall in consumption on impact under both ﬁnancial
integration and autarky. When U.S. households have access to international
markets, rising investment can be ﬁnanced via foreign funds and therefore the
transition becomes less painful.
Towards the post-reform steady state, the consumption path recovers
and in the post-reform steady state, it reaches to a higher level compared to
the pre-reform steady state. The long run gains in the open economy are
lower relative to the closed economy. This is because in the long run, the U.S.
households service their debt and therefore cut some of their consumption.
The U.S. tax reform has major international spillover eﬀects. In particular,
ROW suﬀers an aggregate consumption loss on impact. Their capital stock
declines and output falls.
Figure 1.3 plots the external debt dynamics. A capital tax cut in the
U.S. causes a sudden deterioration of its net foreign asset position, and the lia-
bilities relative to GDP rise by about 50 percentage points relative to the initial
steady state. U.S. net exports decline on impact, and reaches to a higher level
in the short run exceeding its pre-reform level. U.S. current account, which
can be derived as the diﬀerence between aggregate saving and investment, de-
picts a similar pattern. This implies that global ﬁnancial imbalances increase
29
Figure 1.1: Transition dynamics of macroeconomic aggregates
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Figure 1.2: Transition dynamics of factor prices
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sharply, deteriorating further the external debt position of the U.S. Figure 5
shows the factor price movements.
With the elimination of capital income tax, the world interest rate rises.
As capital stock adjusts, the interest rate starts to decline. However, the long
run level of the interest rate is higher than the pre-reform level. The rise in
the labor income tax creates an initial decline in the after-tax wage rate, and
it starts rising as capital accumulation increases. The after-tax wages in the
U.S. cannot reach the level of the pre-reform equilibrium. As can be seen in
Figure 1.2, the movements of factor prices are smaller in magnitude for the
open economy when compared to the closed economy.
iii) Labor income tax adjustment: Since capital income tax is set at 0
under the tax reform, the only source of tax revenue to the government is the
labor income. A rise in the capital stock implies that the pre-tax wage rate
rises. Given the greater ability to accumulate capital in the open economy,
wages rise more and therefore the government needs to raise labor income
tax less relative to the closed economy. Table 3 reports these numbers. The
implications of the price changes are particularly important for the welfare
analyses, and I will continue their discussion in the next session.
Mendoza and Tesar (1998) refer to similar channels in their analysis of
tax reforms in the global economy18 and the qualitative dynamics are similar
to a great extent. One major diﬀerence between the current framework and
18Instead of adjusting the labor tax, they increase the consumption tax.
32
Figure 1.3: Transition dynamics of external accounts
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the neoclassical growth model is, however, the long run movements of factor
prices. Under the neoclassical paradigm, the steady state interest rate is ex-
ogenously determined by the model's parameters, and the reforming country
causes changes in the price dynamics only during the transition, while in this
model, as a consequence of market incompleteness, it is always endogenously
determined.
Macroeconomic dynamics give us an idea about the consequences of
the reform and the potential gains and costs. However, as shown in the next
section, these gains and costs are not distributed equally for all households.
1.4.2 Welfare consequences of tax reform
Now I look more closely at households and show how their welfare is
aﬀected. I also calculate the fractions of population in favor of the tax reform
under ﬁnancial integration and autarky. For this purpose, I simulate a large
artiﬁcial population of households that match the initial steady state distribu-
tions and the wealth distribution observed in the U.S. data. Using the com-
puted equilibrium sequence of interest rates the transition under the reform
and the interest rate under the status quo, I track the two model economies
for many years. I calculate expected welfare gains for households with var-
ious initial asset/productivity combinations. More precisely, I compute the
consumption equivalent welfare gain for a household with a given state pair
E0
∞∑
t=0
βtU(cNRt (1 + g(a0, ε0))) = E0
∞∑
t=0
βtU(cRt ) (1.29)
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where cNRt is the consumption if no reform occurs, and c
R
t is the con-
sumption under the tax reform. Therefore, g(a0, ε0) is the proportional in-
crease in the consumption of a household under status quo that would make
that household indiﬀerent between going through the reform and remaining
in status quo. Figure 1.4 below shows the welfare consequences for the U.S.
households across diﬀerent wealth levels under ﬁnancial integration.
The left vertical axis and the solid line show the consumption equivalent
welfare gain of a household with a given level of wealth; and the right vertical
axis and the dashed line gives the cumulative distribution function of the
households in the U.S. under ﬁnancial integration. As seen in the graph,
households with low asset holdings (the wealth-poor) suﬀer a negative welfare
gain, and as the wealth level increases, welfare gains become positive. The
measure of households with negative welfare gains is large when we look at
the distribution function on the right axis: 70.83% of the U.S. population.
Hence, we conclude that under ﬁnancial integration, the fraction in favor of
the reform is 29.17%.
As discussed earlier, factor price dynamics play an important role in
determining who gains and who loses from a tax reform. An increase in the
after-tax interest rate beneﬁts the whole population, as the borrowing limit
is set at 0, all households are net lenders. Higher interest rate increases the
return to their savings and, therefore, increases their ability to do consumption
smoothing. Along the transition path and in the long run, the after-tax (world)
interest rate rises less under ﬁnancial integration compared to autarky and the
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Figure 1.4: Welfare gains across wealth levels (Financial Integration)
gains become smaller. On the other hand, after-tax wage rate declines after
the tax reform and the change in the after-tax wage is also smaller under
ﬁnancial integration.
Since the primary source of earnings is labor income for wealth-poor
households, a decline in after-tax wage outweighs the gains from an increase
in the interest rate, if there are any. Obviously for example, a household that
is at the borrowing limit suﬀers the biggest loss. But the cost is mitigated
under ﬁnancial integration: the wealth-poor are aﬀected less by the negative
consequences of the reform under ﬁnancial openness. Figure 1.5 shows the
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Figure 1.5: Welfare gains across wealth levels (Autarky)
welfare gains of eliminating the capital income tax under ﬁnancial autarky.
The gains and losses are greatly overestimated under ﬁnancial autarky.
Next, I decompose households according to their initial productivity
levels (Figure 1.6). This is important because a household that starts with a
high productivity is also more likely to accumulate a high level of assets than
a household with low productivity (because productivity shocks are positively
correlated with wealth) given that their initial asset levels are the same. Con-
sequently, the household with a high productivity level is more likely to beneﬁt
from a capital income tax cut. However, productivity shocks constitute an im-
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Figure 1.6: Welfare gains across productivity levels (Financial integration)
portant part of the labor income, and high productivity households are also
taxed more for their labor income. As a result, there are two opposing forces
in assessing the welfare gains for households according to their productivity.
The ﬁrst panel shows the consumption equivalent welfare gain (%) for
households with high productivity shocks prior to the reform. For this group
of households, only a small fraction has a negative welfare gain which makes up
29.17% of the high-productivity group. The majority of the high productivity
households support the reform. For medium and low productivity households,
however, the fraction in favor is smaller: 26.55% and 24.54%, respectively.
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Financial integration Autarky
Fraction in favor 29.17% 26.08%
High productivity group 86.15% 80.26%
Medium productivity group 26.55% 23.62%
Low productivity group 24.54% 20.97%
Table 1.4: Fraction in favor of tax reform
Given that the high productivity households have a small measure in the U.S.
population, the reform is not favored by a majority -as shown in Figure 1.4
earlier.
When the U.S. is modeled as a closed economy however, the fraction
in favor of the reform is underestimated. Table 1.4 compares the results under
two models below.
Table 1.4 shows that a closed economy model underestimates the frac-
tion in favor of the reform by 3.09% compared to the open economy. Similar
diﬀerences can be observed when we look at the three diﬀerent groups, the
major diﬀerence being in the high productivity group, with 5.89%.
I also compute the aggregate welfare eﬀect of the reform to the economy
assuming an utilitarian social welfare function in which a benevolent social
planner assigns equal weight to all households in the U.S. The aggregate welfare
gain is computed as the proportional increase in the consumption of all agents
under status quo that makes the planner indiﬀerent between remaining in the
status quo (with the consumption increase) and implementing the tax reform.
In this aggregate welfare measure, the percentage increase in consumption
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Financial integration Autarky
Aggregate gain -0.24% -1.55%
SS gain 2.16% 3.69%
Transitional cost -2.45% -5.14
Table 1.5: Aggregate welfare gain
is the same for all agents within each country. Therefore, this is also the
percentage increase in aggregate consumption. More precisely, the aggregate
welfare gain for a country is deﬁned as gA that solves
∫
(a0,ε0)
E0
∞∑
t=0
βtU(cNRt (1 + g
A))dΓ0 =
∫
(a0,ε0)
E0
∞∑
t=0
βtU(cRt )dΓ0 (1.30)
Table 1.5 summarizes the results. The reform is costly and through
ﬁnancial openness, the aggregate welfare loss is 84.5% smaller relative to au-
tarky. Steady state gains are smaller, as servicing debt requires consump-
tion losses as discussed earlier. However, international borrowing reduces the
transitional cost to a great extent. The net gain is −0.24% under ﬁnancial
openness.
1.5 Conclusion
I analyze the macroeconomic and welfare consequences of elim-
inating the U.S. capital income tax unilaterally under ﬁnancial integration
with heterogeneous agents and incomplete markets. The labor income tax
is raised to maintain ﬁscal solvency. The reform stimulates investment and
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output which are expanded further by capital inﬂows from abroad; it also pro-
vides welfare gains to the U.S in the long run. These positive consequences
are accompanied with sizable ﬁscal and ﬁnancial imbalances and transmitted
to the rest of the world resulting in welfare losses abroad on impact.
The cost of transition to the reformed steady state is reduced to the
extent that U.S. households can borrow from abroad. However, under a real-
istic calibration of the model the short run costs exceed the gains. The net
cost is 84.5% smaller than the predictions of a closed economy, heterogeneous
agent-incomplete markets model.
The costs and gains of reform are not shared equally across households.
Wealth-poor households that primarily rely on labor income lose due to a
labor tax raise while not gaining much from a capital income tax cut. The
wealth-rich, on the other hand, enjoy welfare gains. International capital ﬂows
help alleviate the costs of the reform to the poor; while reducing the gains
to the rich. This is due to the dynamics of factor prices. Given the high
wealth inequality in the U.S., the reform is not supported by the majority of
population.
My ﬁnal comments are related to the literature on market incomplete-
ness and eﬃciency. Providing households with insurance against idiosyncratic
risk is an obvious yet diﬃcult way to improve welfare. Therefore, govern-
ment policy can be justiﬁed as one way of improving welfare. Dávila, Hong,
Krusell and Ríos-Rull (2012) suggest that taking as given the environment
with uninsured idiosyncratic labor income risk, it may be constrained optimal
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to subsidize capital.
In this paper, I do not draw conclusions on what the optimal tax or
subsidy on capital should be under market incompleteness. However, my ﬁnd-
ings show that, as far as a capital income tax cut is concerned, the negative
eﬀects of market incompleteness are mitigated to a great extent by interna-
tional capital ﬂows. Financial globalization can be interpreted as a natural
mechanism that improves welfare. Since the world economy is in fact ﬁnan-
cially integrated, issues on optimal or constrained optimal taxation should be
investigated through the lens of ﬁnancial openness.
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Chapter 2
What helps forecast US inﬂation?-Mind the gap!
1
2.1 Introduction
Forecasting inﬂationaccurately and reliablyplays a critical role for
policy-making and for the decisions of the private sector in making long-term
nominal commitments. In macroeconomic analysis and inﬂation forecasting,
the traditional Phillips curve has been a widely used model that captures
broadly the empirical relationship between inﬂation and unemployment rate,
capacity utilization or output gap.
As documented by Atkeson and Ohanian (2001), the Phillips curve has
ﬂattened since 1984. Their ﬁnding was that the Phillips curve-based models
did not yield more accurate forecasts than the naïve, 4-quarter random walk
benchmark. Stock and Watson (2007) emphasized the role of lower volatility
in inﬂation in the U.S. and in the world in this period. Hence the risk of naive
forecasts, computed as the mean square forecast error, declined. Forecasts un-
der a Phillips curve speciﬁcation have become less accurate. A survey by Stock
1This essay is drawn from the joint work with Enrique Martinez-Garcia.
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and Watson (2008) suggest recent forecasts based on univariate speciﬁcations
including the Phillips curve performed well only occasionally.
A prominent explanation to the break in the Phillips curve suggested
in the literature is globalization - the integration of global markets in goods,
labor and capital. The recent literature postulated the `global slack hypothe-
sis', i.e. foreign slack as well as domestic slack drives inﬂation in the short-run.
Hence, a more relevant speciﬁcation, the open economy Phillips curve that ties
inﬂation to global measures of economic activity has become a focus of investi-
gation. However, the evidence on the role of global slack is mixed. Binyamini
and Razin (2007) and Martinez-Garcia and Wynne (2010) made theoretical
explanations and Borio and Filardo (2007) provided empirical evidence for the
global slack hypothesis. On the other hand, Milani (2010, 2012) among others,
argue that the foreign economic activity has a role on domestic supply and de-
mand, but its eﬀect on domestic inﬂation is negligible, ﬁnding weak evidence
for the global slack hypothesis.
Even when the theoretical validity of an open economy Phillips curve
is assured, forecasting inﬂation under the open economy framework is a chal-
lenging task. It is in general diﬃcult to ﬁnd suﬃciently long, reliable and
robust time series of global slack -global output gap or capacity utilization.
This has been documented in the current paper as well as in previous studies.
Therefore, it gains particular importance to evaluate forecast accuracy with
various global slack measures and to compare their performances to those from
alternative measures.
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In this paper, we test whether global slack measures have predictive
power for U.S. inﬂation. These measures are constructed by mostly theoretically-
consistent output gap or capacity utilization series of the U.S. and several dif-
ferent groups of countries combined. In addition, following a recent theoretical
ﬁnding in Martinez-Garcia and Wynne (2010), we test the performance of a
global slack measure deﬁned as a combination of two variables: domestic slack
and terms of trade gap. The measure of terms of trade gap is HP-ﬁltered terms
of trade, while the domestic slack series are the U.S. measures of output gap,
capacity utilization and HP-ﬁltered GDP.
Our ﬁrst ﬁnding is that, perhaps in agreement with the existing liter-
ature, these global slack variables yield mixed results in predicting diﬀerent
inﬂation measures. However, a striking result in this paper is that the terms
of trade gap, alone, is a good forecasting variable for U.S. inﬂation. It yields
more accurate forecasts relative to the naive autoregressive process of inﬂation
and it is also robust to various forecast horizons, inﬂation measures and esti-
mation samples, including the late 1980s the period of break in the Phillips
curve pointed out by Atkeson and Ohanian (2001). On the other hand, we
document that most global slack measures yield relatively more accurate fore-
casts for core inﬂation while the forecast with terms of trade gap and domestic
slack perform well at short horizons for headline inﬂation measures. Over-
all, the forecasting performances are not very robust to forecast horizons and
estimation samples.
We conduct pseudo out-of-sample forecasts for six measures of U.S. in-
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ﬂation at horizons varying between 1-quarter to 12-quarter ahead. Our bench-
mark estimation and sample periods are 1980:1-1991:4 and 1992:1-2011:4, re-
spectively. For robustness analyses we go back as far as to 1949:1 and perform
rolling forecasts, to the extent that data series are available. Our metric for
forecast accuracy is the mean square forecast error (MSFE) of a reduced form
new open economy Phillips curve with distributed lags of inﬂation and slack,
relative to the MSFE of the `restricted' forecast described as a univariate, au-
toregressive process of inﬂation. We compute bootstrap standard errors for
the MSFEs following Clark and McCracken (2006).
Another major contribution of this paper is our extensive robustness
analyses where we compare the performance of a selected measures of slack
to a set of widely used variables in the forecasting literature. We test the
predictive performances of a domestic slack series (CBO U.S. slack), a global
slack series (OECD Total slack), a measure of domestic liquidity growth (U.S.
M2 growth) and global liquidity growth (G7 average of monetary aggregates)
and two variables of terms of trade gap (HP-ﬁltered U.S. terms of trade, and
HP-ﬁltered U.S. terms of trade ex. oil). We report the following stylized facts:
• Forecasts with the domestic slack perform signiﬁcantly better than the
simple AR process of inﬂation until late 1960s and particularly at short
horizons. The global slack measure outperforms the simple AR process
signiﬁcantly only in late 1980s and at short horizons.
• In episodes where domestic liquidity growth performs well in forecasting
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U.S. inﬂation, global liquidity growth does not; and vice versa. This
result is in general robust to several inﬂation measures and horizons for
the rolling forecasts starting in 1963 through early 1980s. After that
period, the relative MSFEs of the forecasts are insigniﬁcant for both
variables.
• Forecasts with HP-ﬁltered terms of trade perform signiﬁcantly better
relative to the naïve forecast with the estimation samples starting in
1950s till late 1980s (with the exception in 1980-1983, where the perfor-
mance deteriorates). At some occasions where terms of trade performs
relatively weak, terms of trade ex. oil does signiﬁcantly better.
Therefore, we show that many conventional alternatives do not improve
upon the naïve forecast especially in recent years, while HP-ﬁltered terms of
trade stands out as a relatively successful variable.
In the remainder of the paper, we try to understand these patterns
in the light of a workhorse New Open Economy Macroeconomics (NOEM)
model. Our strategy is to use a model that can capture the eﬀects of two
other competing (or complementary) hypotheses in addition to globalization
good luck and good monetary policy - that are commonly discussed in the
literature as plausible explanations for the observed strengths and weaknesses
in the forecasting performances. To this end, we simulate data based on the
model and use the data to conduct forecasts similar to those in the empirical
section. We estimate MSFEs for many plausible parameter values that capture
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changes in trade openness, volatility in TFP or monetary shocks (which we
call `good luck') and eﬀectiveness of monetary policy reﬂected in Taylor rule
parameters.
For most of these patterns of forecast accuracy, we ﬁnd monetary policy
and good luck seem to be the two important channels, while openness has a
secondary role on forecast accuracy.
2.2 Methodology
2.2.1 Data
Figure B1 plots the series employed throughout the paper. The U.S.
inﬂation rate is calculated as annualized log-diﬀerences of quarterly series of six
price indices: consumer price index (CPI), core CPI (CPI ex. food and energy),
personal consumption expenditure deﬂator (PCE), trimmed-mean PCE, GDP
deﬂator and producer price index (PPI).
We perform inﬂation forecasts using a wide range of domestic and global
slack measures. Our domestic measures consist of CBO U.S. slack, FRBD U.S.
slack, OECD U.S. slack, IMF U.S. slack and HP-ﬁltered U.S. real GDP. For
global slack measures, we use FRBD G7, FRBD G39, OECD G7, OECD Total
and IMF Advanced series. All series are available quarterly, except for the IMF
measures of domestic and global slack, which is available in annual frequency.
We therefore disaggregate these series into quarterly frequency using quadratic
match average.
Terms of trade series is calculated as the ratio of U.S. export price
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index of goods and services and U.S. import price of goods and services. For
terms of trade ex. oil, however, we use the price indices for exported goods
and nonpetroleum imported goods due to limited data availability. We HP
ﬁlter these two series in order to obtain a measure of the terms of trade gap.
We deﬁne global money growth as the average of the percentage growth
rates of broad money stock in G7 countries. While we pick the series for
monetary aggregates that are most similar in deﬁnition, we are constrained
by quarterly data availability for Canada, France, Germany, Italy and Japan
particularly for late 1960s or early 1970s. Since we would like to extend the
robustness analysis of forecasting experiments to a large estimation sample, we
make our primary decision on selection based on data availability. Therefore
our series start in the second quarter of 1963 and we use M2 for U.S., M4 for
UK. We splice two short series of M3 for Canada, M2 for Germany, Italy and
Japan. For France, we also use a spliced series, which combines M2R up to
the ﬁrst quarter of 1970 and M3 afterwards. (A more detailed explanation is
available in the appendix.)
2.2.2 Models
We specify three models to forecast inﬂation. Following Stock and
Watson (2003), we refer the models with explanatory variables as economic
models and we assess to what extent these economic models represent an
improvement over the univariate model of forecasting inﬂation. The ﬁrst model
is a univariate model where we test the predictive power of various regressors.
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Stock and Watson (1999a, b, 2008) provide some empirical evidence in favor
of the Phillips curve as a forecasting tool, suggesting that inﬂation forecasts
produced by the Phillips curve generally are more accurate than forecasts
based on other macroeconomic variables (including interest rates, money and
commodity prices). Consider ﬁrst the traditional backward-looking Phillips
curve relating inﬂation to aggregate real economic activity as typically speciﬁed
by the previous literature
pˆiht+h|t = a1 + λ11(L)pˆit + λ12(L)xˆt + ˆ1,t+h (Model 1)
Denoting the quarterly forecast horizon by h, it is possible to forecast
h-quarter ahead inﬂation, pˆiht+h|t with the distributed lag of earlier inﬂation
rates, pˆit as a proxy for expected inﬂation, and the distributed lag of the
domestic slack measure, xˆt. We start with assessing the predictive performance
of domestic slack in order to compare our results with those of the earlier
studies using this speciﬁcation in the literature. We deﬁne h-quarter ahead
(annualized) inﬂation pˆiht+h|t =
400
h
× [log(Pt+h/Pt)] and forecast inﬂation for
horizons ranging from 1 quarter-ahead to 12-quarters ahead. The number of
lags for each variable is selected based on SIC. To keep the model parsimonious
and since the frequency of the variables is deﬁned as quarterly, the maximum
possible lags allowed for each variable is set as four.
As the global ﬁnancial integration substantially increased in the past 30
years, its consequences on inﬂation, and the consequences of foreign economic
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activity in particular, has become a focus of attention in inﬂation forecast-
ing. Martinez-Garcia and Wynne (2010, 2012), among others argued that the
Phillips curve on economies open to trade depends on global economic activ-
ity and leading or contemporaneous predictors of domestic inﬂation should
include not just domestic but foreign economic activity. We therefore include
global measures of slackas well as domestic slackamong our representative
series. Hence, we test the predictive performance of global slack measures in
an open economy Phillips curve, similar to the one speciﬁed above, where xˆt
is now deﬁned as global slack.
We further evaluate the performance of other variables such as domestic
and global liquidity growth2 and terms of trade gap measures under the same
framework. While the long-run relationship between the growth rate of mone-
tary aggregates and the rate of inﬂation is established by the quantity theory
of money and therefore testing the forecasting performance of liquidity growth
has analytical content, we test the performance of terms of trade gap measures
in light of the theoretical results in Martinez-Garcia and Wynne (2010). We
perform these forecasting exercises here to readdress the role of these measures
in order to provide with a comparison with our main forecasting strategy and
also to make an extensive robustness analysis of the earlier work.3
2D'Agostino and Surico (2009a) evaluate the forecasting performance of the average
growth rate of broad money in G7 economies and ﬁnd that the results are signiﬁcantly more
accurate compared to forecasts with US money growth.
3Stock and Watson (1999) forecast U.S. inﬂation with a large set of variables, including
economic indicators other than the variables of real economic activity. These include U.S.
eﬀective exchange rate and a number of foreign exchange rates. They report that exchange
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The issue of how to measure the output gapboth domestic and foreign
has been known as a major challenge. For purely statistical approaches, which
in most cases derive potential output using actual (real) output series through
a ﬁltering technique (most commonly the HP ﬁlter), the choice of the ﬁlter
is usually an arbitrary decision. In addition, applying these techniques are
known to create end-point problems. For structural estimates of the output
gap, relying on a production function (such as Cobb-Douglas) and quantifying
the total factor productivity, the capital stock or labor employed tend to pose
measurement problems (Gerlach, 2011).
Measuring the foreign output gap, however is an even more challenging
task since for the emerging market economies that are believed to potentially
aﬀect the U.S. inﬂation, the data series to measure unemployment rates or
capacity utilization in manufacturing are usually either too short or they are
not available. Furthermore, there is also not a clear idea on how the dynamics
of foreign output gap aﬀects the domestic inﬂation. Therefore, estimating the
open-economy Phillips curve based on the combination of domestic and foreign
slack as a measure of the global slack becomes a diﬃculty.
To circumvent the problem of measuring the foreign slack, we follow the
theoretical approach taken in a previous work by Martinez-Garcia and Wynne
(2010) and deﬁne global slack in reduced form as a combination of domestic
slack and terms of trade gap. To estimate this new formulation of the open-
rates do not yield better inﬂation forecasting performance than a Phillips curve speciﬁcation.
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economy Phillips-curve, we follow the literature, and take a backward-looking
approach for the reduced-form estimate of the curve. The regression equation
in this case can be described as an autoregressive distributed lag model which
is our ﬁrst model to forecast inﬂation:
pˆiht+h|t = a2 + λ21(L)pˆit + λ22(L)xˆt + λ23(L)zˆt + ˆ2,t+h (Model 2)
Under this speciﬁcation, xˆt denotes one of the domestic output gap measures
and zˆt denotes one of the terms of trade gap measures (all variables in levels).
Having suggested two diﬀerent `unrestricted' reduced-form models, we
ﬁnally introduce the `restricted' model. Under this speciﬁcation, we estimate
a univariate autoregressive (AR) process:
pˆiht+h|t = a3 + λ3(L)pˆit + ˆ3,t+h (Model 3)
2.2.3 Forecast scheme
We perform forecasts based on the pseudo out-of-sample forecasting
method and particularly focus on recursive samples. Therefore, at any given
date t, we forecast inﬂation at date t+ h using all available data up to date t.
The models are estimated by OLS.
We assess the multi-step pseudo out-of-sample forecasting performance
of a model that incorporates the variables commonly thought as contempora-
neous or leading indicators of inﬂation relative to the forecast of a univariate
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autoregressive process. Our forecast evaluation metric, the relative MSFE, is
the ratio of MSFE of the economic model (Model 1 or Model 2) relative to
that of the benchmark AR model (Model 3). Let T0 denote the starting date
of the data series and T1 denote the end. The estimation sample starts at T0
and ends in t0. We start by using all data up to date t0 to forecast inﬂation at
date t0 + h. By adding data to the estimation sample, we keep estimating the
parameters of the model of interest. The h−step recursive forecast continues
until period T1 − h with a total of T1 − h − t0 + 1 steps. For a given model
j, this procedure yields a sequence of forecast errors which helps us construct
the MSFE of the model at horizon h and from date t0 to T1 − h
MSFEj(h) =
1
T1 − h− t0 + 1
T1−h∑
t=t0
ˆˆ2j,t+h
2.2.4 Inference and samples
Inference is based on the F-statistics against critical values based on a
bootstrap algorithm described in Clark and McCracken (2006).4 This proce-
dure involves resampling from the residuals of a vector autoregressive (VAR)
equations. In order to test the predictive ability of a single variable fore-
cast as in Model 1, we deﬁne an equation for inﬂation (as governed by the
restricted model) and an equation for the predicting variable, where the lag
4The construction of F-statistics as well as t-statistics are described in Clark and Mc-
Cracken (2001, 2002a, b). Inference can also be based on t-statistics, however, as Clark and
McCracken (2001, 2002a, b) suggest, F-type tests are more powerful than the corresponding
t-type tests and therefore we focus on F-statistics only.
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length for the predicting variable and inﬂation is determined based on SIC.
The equations of the data generation process (DGP) are estimated by OLS
with a number of bootstrap iterations equal to 5000. For a bivariate forecast
involving an additional predicting variable as in Model 2, we suggest a similar
methodology. In this case, the DGP involves the estimation of a 3-equation
VAR. The ﬁrst equation is the AR process of inﬂation, as deﬁned in the boot-
strap algorithm of the univariate forecast. The remaining two equations are
the equations for the predicting variables where we include the lagged values
of all three variables (inﬂation and two predicting variables) as regressors in
each equation. Again, the lag length selection is based on SIC. We have a
one-sided test with the null hypothesis that an economic model (Model 1 or
2) does not yield more accurate forecasts than the AR process (Model 3),
i.e. MSFEAR ≤ MSFEEM , against the alternative MSFEAR > MSFEEM .
Throughout the paper, we report the MSFE of the benchmark model and the
relative MSFEs of a particular economic model and the benchmark. The null
hypothesis is expressed as `the relative MSFE is greater than or equal to 1'.
We report the p-values of the F-test at 1%, 5% and 10% signiﬁcance levels.
In our benchmark experiments, the estimation sample begins in the
1980:Q1 and ends in 1991:Q4 and the pseudo out-of-sample forecasting period
begins in 1992:Q1 and 2011:Q4 leaving us with an estimation sample of 48
quarters and the pseudo out-of-sample forecasting sample of 80 quarters).5
5Our selection of the size of the estimation and pseudo out-of-sample forecasting samples
in the benchmark experiments follow that of D'Agostino and Surico (2009) which enables
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In addition to our benchmark forecasting experiment, we conduct a
series of other experiments going back in time to the extent that the series
are available in order to make a robustness analysis. More speciﬁcally, start-
ing with the initial observation in the sample, we shift the estimation and
forecast samples backward by one quarter and obtain the relative MSFEs of
the forecasts for each rolling window.6 Each window spans 48 quarters of an
estimation sample and 48 quarters of a forecasting sample.
Finally, in order to gain insight about our ﬁndings and our potential
explanations for them, we also run forecasts with the simulated data consis-
tent with the model in Martinez-Garcia and Wynne (2010). Under various
parameterizations of the model, we try to understand how factors such as
trade openness, the stance of monetary policy towards inﬂation and the size
of the monetary and productivity shocks to the economy aﬀect the predictive
ability of these variables. The forecast scheme for this group of experiments
is also recursive.7 We discuss the details of these experiments in section 4.
2.3 Empirical Findings
The results of the pseudo out-of-sample forecast with one variable over
the benchmark sample are reported in Tables B1 and B2; while the results
us a comparison of the measures used to forecast inﬂation with their measures of money.
In our robustness analyses we make a symmetric allocation of the observations for the two
samples.
6The starting dates are provided in more detail in the appendix.
7The bootstrap procedure for the F-test in these experiments involves 500 iterations.
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with two variables are summarized in Tables B3 and B4. Our ﬁndings can be
listed as follows:
1. Based on the one-variable forecast results, it is not possible to say that
global slack measures outperform the domestic slack measures. In gen-
eral, both measures almost equally yield more accurate predictions com-
pared to an AR process when the inﬂation measure is core CPI and
trimmed mean PCE. For other measures of inﬂation however, we con-
clude that the AR process of inﬂation performs better.
2. Global money growth (measured as G7 average) exhibits a better fore-
casting performance relative to U.S. money growth, at all horizons for
CPI, core CPI and PCE deﬂator. Both variables have a signiﬁcantly poor
performance compared to the AR process in all other inﬂation measures.
Under the forecasts of CPI and PCE inﬂation, G7 money growth does
also better compared to domestic or global slack measures. However,
this is not true for the other measures of inﬂation.
3. Forecasting performance of terms of trade (HP-ﬁltered) is comparable to
those of domestic and global slack measures. Terms of trade ex. oil has
no signiﬁcant improvement over the AR speciﬁcation across any of the
inﬂation measures and at any horizon.
4. Our results of the two-variable forecasts are rather mixed. Forecasts
with domestic slack and terms of trade provide higher accuracy at short
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horizons for CPI and PCE compared to the forecasts with domestic or
global slack alone. For GDP deﬂator and core CPI, one-variable forecasts
do better. When domestic slack and terms of trade ex. oil are evaluated,
it can be concluded that the two variables combined improve forecasting
performance for GDP deﬂator especially at short horizons and for PPI
at long horizons. Results with two-variable forecasts using domestic or
global money growth measures in addition to terms of trade or terms of
trade ex. oil, do not improve the predictions.
We perform rolling window experiments for three groups of variables:
a domestic slack measure vs. global slack measure; terms of trade vs.
terms of trade ex. oil and ﬁnally domestic vs. global liquidity growth.
Among several alternatives, we choose CBO measure as the domestic
slack variable and `OECD Total' as our global slack measure. Our se-
lection of the two measures is based mainly on the length of the series
and relatively better performance compared to other slack measures at
hand. In Figures 2a-4b, we show how the forecasting performances of
these pairs of variables evolve over time. In these ﬁgures, several inter-
esting points emerge:
5. The predictive ability of money growth measures vary signiﬁcantly over
time (Figures B.2-3). In particular, we observe a pattern such that
whenever domestic money growth has a poor performance, global money
growth performs well and vice versa. During late 1970s, there is a re-
markable deterioration in the forecasting power of global money growth,
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which is outperformed by domestic money growth especially in long-
horizon forecasts. After this period, forecasting ability of global money
growth recovers rapidly although its performance compared to the AR
process is not necessarily superior. This is interesting, because our em-
pirical results based on the benchmark sample are in line with those
in D'Agostino and Surico (2009) where they analyze the 1990:1-2006:2
period and show that global money growth-based forecasts seem to be
a strong forecasting variable relative to domestic money as well as the
naive forecasts of inﬂation. However, these results do not seem to be
robust to sample selection after 1980s as shown in Figures B.2-3.
6. For slack measures however, and with limited data availability, the pat-
terns mentioned above can no longer be pronounced (Figures B.4-5). Our
comparison of domestic and global slack measures show that the predic-
tive power of the two measures move almost together through time, and
with rare occasions they become signiﬁcantly more powerful than the AR
process in forecasting inﬂation. In forecasts starting from 1949 through
1970s (where global slack measures are not available) the CBO mea-
sure of U.S. slack has a signiﬁcantly better performance than the AR
speciﬁcation, especially at short horizons.
7. Terms of trade and terms of trade ex. oil produce a similar (albeit
slightly weaker) `switching' pattern in terms of forecasting performance
over time (Figures B.6-7). Except for core measures of inﬂation (core CPI
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and trimmed mean PCE, which are also relatively short series), terms of
trade yields signiﬁcantly more accurate forecasts starting in late 1950s
through mid 1970s and its performance deteriorates in general during late
1970s. The MSFEs of the forecasts with terms of trade ex. oil follow
a not so uniform pattern and shows a great variability in performance
across horizons or inﬂation measures while outperforming terms of trade
at certain intervals. Particularly for the 1980s however, terms of trade
and terms of trade ex. oil appear to be doing better in forecasting
inﬂation compared to monetary aggregates or output gap measures.
In the next section, we aim to investigate the causes behind these puz-
zles. First, we would like to understand why domestic and global slack
measures do not perform well and global money growth comes out as a
superior measure to forecast U.S. inﬂation. Second, and related to the
previous puzzle, we are not clear as to why domestic slack measures along
with terms of trade (or terms of trade ex. oil) do not improve forecasting
accuracy as much as expected. Third, in theory, we would expect the
HP-ﬁltered slack measures to perform not as great as the slack measures
that are calculated with a production function approach.
2.4 Interpreting the results
In order to understand the empirical results more clearly, we simulate
the model in Martinez-Garcia and Wynne (2010) which is a variant of the New
Open Economy Macro model of Clarida, Gali and Gertler (2002). We brieﬂy
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mention the building blocks of this model.
2.4.1 The New Open Economy Macro Model
There are two countries, Home and Foreign. The current model consists
of three basic structural equations for each country and two exogenous shocks.
We denote Foreign variables with an asterisk (∗). To denote the deviation in
logs from its steady state, vˆt ≡ ln(Vt/V ), for a variable Vt at its steady state
V. Similarly, we denote the deviation of the potential (or frictionless) value of
a variable from its steady state as vˆnt ≡ ln(V nt /V ).
Aggregate demand is described by an equation that links the output
gap, xˆt to domestic and foreign interest rates, ıˆt and ıˆ∗t , natural rates ıˆ
n
t and
ıˆn∗t , and inﬂation pˆit and pˆi
∗
t
γ(2ξ−1)(Etxˆt+1− xˆt) ≈ [((2ξ−1)+Γ)[(ˆıt− ıˆnt )−Etpˆit+1]−Γ[(ˆı∗t − ıˆn∗t )−Etpˆi∗t+1]
(2.1)
Aggregate supply is deﬁned as a Phillips curve relating inﬂation gap to
domestic and foreign output gaps
pˆit ≈ βEtpˆit+1 + Φ [(ϕξ + Θγ)xˆt + ((1− ξ)ϕ+ (1−Θ)γ)xˆ∗t ] (2.2)
As shown in a previous work by Martinez-Garcia and Wynne (2010),
under the producer currency pricing (PCP) assumption, it is possible to ex-
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press the dynamics of the domestic (cyclical) inﬂation, pˆit, in terms of the
domestic output gap, xˆt and the terms of trade gap, zˆt
pˆit = βEtpˆit+1 + Φ[(ϕ+ γ)xˆt + Ψpi,z zˆt] (2.3)
Monetary policy rule is expressed à la Taylor (1993)
ıˆt ≈ ρiıˆt−1 + (1− ρi)[Ψpipˆit + Ψxxˆt] + mˆt. (2.4)
Domestic money growth is derived by ﬁrst diﬀerencing the ad hoc log-
linear money demand equation
∆lˆt ≈ ∆yˆt − η∆ıˆt + pˆit. (2.5)
We also deﬁne the natural interest rate as the weighted average of
expected domestic and foreign productivity growth,
ıˆnt ≈
(
1 + ϕ
γ + ϕ
)[
Θi,aEt[∆aˆt+1] + Θi,a∗Et[∆aˆ
∗
t+1]
]
(2.6)
the potential output as the weighted average of domestic and foreign
productivity gap,
yˆnt ≈
(
1 + ϕ
γ + ϕ
)
[λ˜aaˆt + λ˜a∗ aˆ
∗
t ] (2.7)
output gap,
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xˆt = yˆt − yˆnt
and ﬁnally terms of trade and terms of trade gap,
t̂ott ≈ γ(yˆt − yˆ
∗
t )
σγ − (σγ − 1)(2ξ − 1)2 and zˆt ≡ t̂ott − t̂ot
n
t (2.8)
respectively. For Foreign, the equations of the model can be described
symmetrically.
Finally, the law of motion for productivity shocks and monetary shocks
is governed by
(
aˆt
aˆ∗t
)
≈
(
δa δa,a∗
δa,a∗ δa
)(
aˆt−1
aˆ∗t−1
)
+
(
εˆat
εˆa∗t
)
(2.9)
(
εˆat
εˆa∗t
)
∼ N
((
0
0
)
,
(
σ2a ρa,a∗
ρa,a∗ σ2a
))
(2.10)
(
mˆt
mˆ∗t
)
≈
(
δm 0
0 δm
)(
mˆt−1
mˆ∗t−1
)
+
(
εˆmt
εˆm∗t
)
(2.11)
(
εˆmt
εˆm∗t
)
∼ N
((
0
0
)
,
(
σ2m ρm,m∗
ρm,m∗ σ2m
))
(2.12)
where the composite parameters are given by
Φ ≡ (1− α)(1− βα)
α
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Ψpi,z ≡ −σ(1− ξ)(ϕ+ γ) + (σ − 1
γ
)(ξ − ξ∗)(ϕ(1− ξ)(η − η∗)− γ(1− η))
Γ ≡ (1− ξ) [σγ + (σγ − 1)(2ξ − 1)]
Θ ≡ ξ
[
σγ−(σγ−1)(2ξ−1)
σγ−(σγ−1)(2ξ−1)2
]
Θi,a ≡ γ
[(
σγ−(σ− 1
γ
)(ξ−ξ∗)(1−η˜)
σ−(σ− 1
γ
)(ξ−ξ∗)(η˜−η˜∗)
)
λ˜a +
(
σ(1−ξ)−(σ− 1
γ
)(ξ−ξ∗)(1−η˜)
σ−(σ− 1
γ
)(ξ−ξ∗)(η˜−η˜∗)
)
λ˜∗a
]
Θi,a∗ ≡ γ
[(
σγ − (σ − 1
γ
)(ξ − ξ∗)(1− η˜)
σ − (σ − 1
γ
)(ξ − ξ∗)(η˜ − η˜∗)
)
λ˜a∗ +
(
σ(1− ξ)− (σ − 1
γ
)(ξ − ξ∗)(1− η˜)
σ − (σ − 1
γ
)(ξ − ξ∗)(η˜ − η˜∗)
)
λ˜∗a∗
]
λ˜a ≡ 1 + (σ − 1
γ
)
[
γ((1− ξ) + (ξ − ξ∗)(1− η˜))
ϕ(σ − (σ − 1
γ
)(ξ − ξ∗)(η˜ − η˜∗)) + 1
]
λ˜a∗ ≡ −(σ − 1
γ
)
[
γ((1− ξ) + (ξ − ξ∗)(1− η˜))
ϕ(σ − (σ − 1
γ
)(ξ − ξ∗)(η˜ − η˜∗)) + 1
]
λ˜∗a ≡ −(σ −
1
γ
)
[
γ(ξ∗ + (ξ − ξ∗)(1− η˜∗))
ϕ(σ − (σ − 1
γ
)(ξ − ξ∗)(η˜ − η˜∗)) + 1
]
λ˜∗a∗ ≡ 1 + (σ −
1
γ
)
[
γ(ξ∗ + (ξ − ξ∗)(η˜∗)
ϕ(σ − (σ − 1
γ
)(ξ − ξ∗)(η˜ − η˜∗)) + 1
]
η˜ ≡ nξ
nξ + (1− n)ξ∗
η˜∗ ≡ n(1− ξ)
n(1− ξ) + (1− n)(1− ξ∗)
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The model parameters are summarized in Table 2.1 below. Under the
benchmark parameterization, the structural parameters of the model are cho-
sen as β = 0.99, γ = ϕ = 5, σ = 1.5, ξ = 0.06, and α = 0.75, in light
of Chari, Kehoe and McGrattan (2002). This is also similar to the closed
economy model of Neiss and Nelson (2003) and Neiss and Nelson (2005). We
assume that countries are equal in population, n = 0.5 and the allocation of
home and foreign goods in the consumption basket of each country is sym-
metric, ξ = 1− ξ∗. We set η = 4 as described in Gali (2008). We assume that
the Taylor rule is inertial and the policy rule is identical in both countries.
Following Rudebusch (2006), we set monetary policy parameters estimated to
match the U.S. data such that ρi = 0.78, Ψpi = 1.24 and Ψx = 0.33, and the
AR(1) monetary shock process parameters of persistence and volatility such
that δm = 0 and σm = 0.36, respectively. For the productivity shock process,
these parameters are chosen as δa = 0.97, and σa = 0.73, as in Heathcote and
Perri (2002). Based on their estimates, the cross-country spillover parame-
ter δa,a∗ is set at 0.025.The correlations of domestic and foreign productivity
and monetary innovations are ρa,a∗ = 0.29 and ρm,m∗ = 0.5, following Chari,
Kehoe and McGrattan (2002). We assume further that the monetary and
productivity innovations are uncorrelated with each other.8
8Unlike Benati and Surico (2008), where they estimated the model before running their
experiments, we have calibrated the model. One possible argument in favor of calibration
is that the model is too simpliﬁed so we are concerned that estimating it would lead to
misspeciﬁcation bias and, therefore, would complicate the interpretation of our estimates
and our subsequent experiments even more.
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Structural parameters
Intertemporal discount factor 0 < β < 1
Inverse of the intertemporal elasticity of substitution γ > 0
Inverse of the Frisch elasticity of labor supply ϕ > 0
Interest semi-elasticity of money demand η > 0
Elasticity of substitution across varieties within a country θ > 1
Elasticity of substitution between Home and Foreign bundles σ > 0
Share of Home goods in the Home basket 0 < ξ < 1
Share of Home goods in the Foreign basket 0 < ξ∗< 1
Home population size, Mass of Home varieties 0 < n < 1
Foreign population size, Mass of Foreign varieties 0 < 1− n < 1
Calvo (1983) price stickiness parameter 0 < α < 1
Monetary policy parameters
Monetary policy inertia 0 < ρi< 1
Sensitivity to deviations from the inﬂation target Ψpi> 1
Sensitivity to deviations from the potential output target Ψx> 0
Shock parameters
Persistence of the productivity shock −1 < δa< 1
Volatility of the productivity shock σa> 0
Correl. between Home and Foreign productivity innovations −1 < ρa,a∗ < 1
Persistence of the monetary policy shock −1 < δm< 1
Volatility of the monetary policy shock σm> 0
Correl. between Home and Foreign monetary innovations −1 < ρm,m∗ < 1
Table 2.1: Model parameters
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2.4.2 Simulated forecasts
We run a Monte Carlo simulation of the model with 100 trials and
with a subsample of 160 periods for each trial. Using the simulated data, we
forecast inﬂation using one-variable recursive forecasts. We split 160 periods
equally between estimation and pseudo out-of-sample forecast samples and
conduct forecasts using i) domestic and global money growth, ii) terms of
trade gap and HP-ﬁltered terms of trade, and iii) domestic and global output
gap. In particular, we calculate the (relative) MSFEs at a grid of points that
spans the space for selected parameters, while keeping other parameters at
their benchmark values. (We select an interval for the grid search so that the
benchmark values of these parameters fall in that interval.) In these 100 trials,
we evaluate forecasting performance based on the median (relative) MSFE,
median p-value of the hypothesis that the relative MSFE is greater than or
equal to 1, and the fraction of statistically signiﬁcant trials with p-values less
than or equal to 10%.
The analyses conducted here can be grouped under three main experi-
ments: i) Good luck, ii)Monetary policy, and iii) Openness.
i) Good luck9 experiment focuses on how forecasting performance of the
regressors listed above is altered when the parameters of innovations, speciﬁ-
9In the current terminology, `good luck' is used in order to explore the possibility of
exogenous changes in the distribution of the shock process. These changes might cause
a draw of unusually benign shocks to the economy. Good luck might be the result of an
unusual draw of shocks from the right-tail of distribution but that is not the interpretation
we give here. Rather, we interpret good luck as the shift in the distribution of shocks.
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cally the volatility of shocks, σm and σa take on diﬀerent values. We run two
versions of this experiment. In the ﬁrst version, we conduct the experiment
symmetrically for both countries. Hence for σm and σa, and σm∗ and σa∗ ,
we set values both varying within (0, 2]. In the second one, we change the
parameterization of U.S. only, keeping the ROW parameters constant.
The literature on Great Moderation provides with important empirical
ﬁndings on the evolution of these variables over time. The Great Moderation
era is mainly characterized by reductions in the conditional variance in time-
series models. The variance reduction is generally attributed to a smaller
error variance, not to changes in the autoregressive coeﬃcients, as suggested
by Stock and Watson (2003a), Ahmed, Levin, and Wilson (2002), Blanchard
and Simon (2001) and McConnell and Perez-Quiros (2000). Stock and Watson
(2003a) calculated a sharp decline in the volatility of the U.S. GDP growth
in the ﬁrst quarter of 1984. Volatility is highest in 1970s, and considerably
high in 1960s and early 1980s10. They calculate similar volatility declines in
macroeconomic variables, including nominal variables such as inﬂation (GDP
deﬂator) and 90-day T-bill rate. Moreover, Stock and Watson (2005) and Fogli
and Perri (2006) document that the moderation is a world-wide phenomenon,
also observed in Japan and EU, but the greatest moderation was observed in
the U.S. Taking into account this evidence, an asymmetric experiment seems
10Stock and Watson (2003a) report the standard deviations of four-quarter growth rate of
real GDP. The standard deviation in the post-1984 period is 0.59 times that of the pre-1984
period. (Standard deviation in the 1970-1980 period is highest, but still comparable to its
1960-1970 level.)
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more relevant.
Stock and Watson (2003a) provide a helpful comparison of the mon-
etary shock volatilities for the pre-1983 and post-1984 era. Using structural
VAR and implementing the methodologies of Christiano, Eichenbaum and
Evans (1998) and Bernanke and Mihov (1997),11 they compute the implied
money shocks. Volatility of these monetary shocks exhibited a decline in the
great moderation era, following a high level of volatility in 1960-83 and hav-
ing a peak during 1979-83.12 Similarly, Smets and Wouters (2007), report a
decline in the volatility of both shocks in the US in an extended DSGE model
for the Great Moderation era (1984-2004) relative to the Great Inﬂation era
(1966-79).
ii) Our monetary policy experiments pay attention to forecasting per-
formance under changes in the monetary policy parameters Ψpi and Ψx, one
with high monetary policy inertia, ρi = 0.78 and one with low inertia, ρi = 0.
For Ψpi, we try values of grid points in the interval (1, 3] and Ψx, in the interval
(0, 2]. Coibion and Gorodnichenko (2011), among others13, provide historical
estimates of the coeﬃcients of a generalized Taylor rule. Their estimates of
Ψx do not show much variation from late 1960s to early 2000s. They indicate
that both the inertia of the monetary policy and the parameter on inﬂation
11They take into account that the monetary policy shifted over the sample period.
12Volatility of money shocks during 1984-2001 is about 0.50 times the volatility in 1960-
1983 and about 0.76 times the volatility in 1960-1978 period according to CEE methodology.
13See also Stock and Watson (2003) for a summary of historical estimates of Taylor Rule
coeﬃcients in the US calculated by Judd and Rudebusch (1998), Taylor (1999) and Clarida,
Gali and Gertler (2000).
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gap have increased recently. Their time varying estimate for Ψpi is relatively
high in late 1960s as well as early 1980s and onwards, but low during 1970s. A
similar pattern is observed for the inertia parameter, ρi. The case ρi = 0.78 in
our simulated forecasts is close to the upperbound estimated by Coibion and
Gorodnichenko (2011) while ρi = 0 is not comparable to their lower bound.
Rudebusch (2006) provides evidence that for 1990s, a positive inertia param-
eter in the policy rule is more plausible. However, a non-inertial policy rule is
a common benchmark in the literature (e.g. Taylor (1993) and Yellen (2004))
and is therefore a natural case to investigate especially to understand the pat-
terns before 1990s.
iii) The ﬁnal experiment, trade openness, involves a grid search over
the parameters of share of Home goods in the Home basket, ξ and elasticity
of substitution between Home and Foreign bundles, σ. For ξ we try the values
in the intervals (0, 0.5], hence, under the case ξ is close to 0, the economy is
almost closed and there is home bias, while under ξ = 0.5 there is no bias
between consumption and production and the economy is open. For σ, we try
values within the range (0, 2] where σ = 1 implies the consumption aggregator
is Cobb-Douglas type.
2.4.3 Results
We illustrate our results from the symmetric good luck experiment in
Figures B.8-16 in the Appendix. The key results are:
1. If a symmetric change in the volatility of productivity and monetary
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shocks in the U.S. and the ROW has a signiﬁcant eﬀect on the forecasting
performance of variables, it is on domestic slack only.
2. Starting from the benchmark parameterization (σa = 0.73 and σm =
0.36) and for a given σm (and σm∗), a decline in σa (and σa∗) might
deteriorate the forecasting ability of domestic slack; for a given σa (and
σa∗), a decline in σm (and σm∗) might deteriorate the forecasting ability
of domestic slack (Figures 5a and 6a). However, it would require a large
swing from the benchmark parameterization to see the changes in the
forecast accuracy observed in the data.
3. The experiment shows that only in a small fraction of instances (less than
40%) some variables (global slack, domestic money growth and terms of
trade gap) seem to be marginally statistically signiﬁcant.
Hence, in theory, we can conclude that the performance of the tradi-
tional Phillips curve based forecasts of U.S. inﬂation might have changed due
to Great Moderationif it is interpreted as a world-wide phenomenon that af-
fected most countries equally. If we allow for asymmetries à la Fogli and Perri
(2006), then HP-ﬁltered terms of trade starts to matter in forecasting U.S.
inﬂation. The results from the asymmetric good luck experiment are depicted
in Figures B.16-25:
1. Relative to the symmetric experiment, we observe larger statistically
signiﬁcant regions for domestic slack, global slack, HP-ﬁltered terms of
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trade and terms of trade gap and very weak results for domestic and
global money supply growth.
2. The volatility changes in productivity and money might make HP-ﬁltered
terms of trade a key variable in forecasting inﬂation.
3. The statistically signiﬁcant regions for domestic slack and HP ﬁltered
terms of trade do not overlap, so if the volatility driving the productivity
and monetary shocks change over time, the forecasting performances of
these diﬀerent variables may have been aﬀected in an opposite way:
domestic slack's value as a forecasting variable might decline while HP
ﬁltered terms of trade gains value and vice-versa.
Since we do not have actual measures of terms of trade gap, in the
empirical analysis we use the HP-ﬁltered terms of trade. There are diﬀerences
between the forecasting power of HP-ﬁltered terms of trade and the terms of
trade gap and there is a weak correlation between these two variables for the
benchmark parameters (Figure B.53-54).
We show our results from the monetary policy experiment with low
inertia in Figures B.26-34. The benchmark values for Ψpi = 1.24 and Ψx = 0.33,
respectively. We summarize the ﬁndings as follows:
1. With low inertia, more aggressive monetary policy on inﬂation (for a
given Ψx) increases the percentage of instances in which the forecasting
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power is statistically signiﬁcant. A high anti-inﬂationary bias of mone-
tary policy can make domestic and global slack stronger in forecasting
inﬂationwhile this is also valid for domestic money, global money and
terms of trade gap but the eﬀect seems statistically less signiﬁcant on
these variables.
2. For a given Ψpi, increases in Ψx do not seem to have much of an eﬀect
on forecast accuracy of variables.
In turn, the pattern is somewhat reversed when we look at the high
inertia case (see Figures B.35-43):
1. In this case, the policy does not seem to have a high inﬂuence on fore-
casting ability except for domestic slackwhich is also not very strong.
For a given Ψx increases in the anti-inﬂation bias of policy (Ψpi) tend
to reduce the share of statistically signiﬁcant samples. Whenever Ψx
increases, then the share of statistically signiﬁcant samples tends to in-
crease for a given Ψpi.
2. Changes in inertia parameter appear to be key, and perhaps the most
inﬂuential channel on predictive ability of variables tested in these ex-
periments. When inertia is high, the response of policy is very delayed
and using current variables as predictors of inﬂation can be a bad proxy
for what monetary policy does and therefore for how inﬂation will be in
the future.
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Our results from the openness experiment are shown in Figures B.44-
52. The benchmark values for the parameters of interest are ξ = 0.06 and
σ = 1.5, respectively.
1. This is the only channel that explains the switches between domestic
and foreign variables however, for the slack variables only. Keeping σ
constant, an increase in the share of Home goods in the Home basket,
ξ, causes a weaker performance for the domestic output gap, i.e. the
traditional closed-economy Phillips curve predicts domestic inﬂation less
accurately while implying a better performance for the open economy
Phillips curve.
2. This experiment is silent on why domestic money supply growth may be
a good predictor of U.S. inﬂation while global money supply growth is
poor and vice versa.
3. Forecast accuracy is almost invariant to changes in the elasticity of sub-
stitution between Home and Foreign bundles, σ (for a given ξ) especially
in the neighborhood of the benchmark parameterization.
We provide a summary of results in Table 2.2 where we show which
channels in the model might play a statistically signiﬁcant eﬀect in forecasts
in at least 50% of the time. We draw three important conclusions from these
experiments (if we consider movements relative to the benchmark parameter-
ization):
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• Phillips curve based forecasts of inﬂation may be aﬀected by a combina-
tion of all three channels: good luck, monetary policy and openness.
• Asymmetric changes in volatilities of productivity and monetary shocks
can be responsible for the high performance of HP-ﬁltered terms of trade.
• There is nothing that matters more than monetary policy in the perfor-
mances of all variables tested here except for HP-ﬁltered terms of trade.
And it is clear that it is the systematic part that is the key determinant
of when and how these variables become more useful for forecasting. It
is not only the response to inﬂation that matters a lot (the response to
the output gap has only minor eﬀects in our current experiments), but
the fact that policy responses could be gradual or abrupt.
Having established the main ﬁndings from the simulated forecasts, we
move to the next section where we aim to explain how primary domestic and
global macroeconomic phenomena since 1960s aﬀected the predictive accuracy
of our variables and what accounts for these changes.
2.4.4 Relating theory to stylized facts
Now we turn to Figures B.2-7 in order to explain how major episodes
for the U.S. economy can be related to forecasting performances. We analyze
these ﬁgures paying particular attention to CPI inﬂation, since the model at
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Domestic Global ToT ToT gap Domestic Global
slack slack HP-ﬁltered money money
Good luck σm X
(symmetric) σa X
Good luck σm X X X X
(asymmetric) σa X X X X
Monetary policy Ψpi X X X X X
(low inertia) Ψx
Monetary policy Ψpi X
(high inertia) Ψx X
Openness ξ X X
σ
Table 2.2: Predictive performances of variables
Note: This table reports whether changes in a given parameter have a statistically signiﬁcant
impact on predictive ability of a variable (at least at 10% signiﬁcance level) in at least 50%
of the trials of the experiment.
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hand is consistent with this measure of inﬂation. However, forecasting patterns
are robust to other measures of inﬂation to a great extent.
• Domestic (US) and global (G7) money supply growth: Figures B.2-3 re-
veal that especially at long horizons, US money supply growth helps
forecast US inﬂation starting in late 1960s until mid 1970s. In samples
starting earlier or later than this period, we obtain lower forecast accu-
racy for this variable relative to naive forecasts. Interestingly, the periods
that US money supply growth does not perform well in general coincide
with the periods G7 money supply growth performs well. Our model
suggests that these variables can matter for forecasting only because
of monetary policy and especially when monetary policy is non-inertial
(ρi = 0), and highly anti-inﬂationary (i.e. high Ψpi). On the other
hand, the historical estimates for the monetary policy parameters dur-
ing the 1970s reveal that inertia was low but the monetary policy was
not anti-inﬂationary. Hence, none of these variables should have high
performance during the 1970s as well as outside the 1970s. Therefore,
periods during which any of these variables perform well are puzzling in
light of our model and we only explain why they do not perform well.
• Domestic (CBO) and global (OECD) slack: Figures B.4-5 show that fore-
casts with domestic slack (i.e. the traditional closed-economy Phillips
curve-based forecasts) perform well until 1960s, but any forecast that is
based on a sample starting after 1960s in general is less accurate than
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a naive forecast. According to our model, one channel that can explain
this is openness. The model suggests that under low trade openness,
we should expect a high predictive performance by U.S. slack. In addi-
tion, a combination of high monetary policy shock volatility (σm) and
high productivity shock volatility (σa) might have improved this perfor-
mance while the stance of monetary policy (high anti-inﬂation bias of
policy (Ψpi) with high monetary policy inertia (ρi)) could have reduced
it. Overall, the net eﬀect of these channels might have resulted in a high
forecast accuracy in the 1960s.
In the 1970s, both the anti-inﬂation bias and inertia of monetary policy
were low, so this would cause a low performance both domestic and global
slack according to our theory especially at long horizons which should be the
leading explanation for the low performance of Phillips curve-based forecasts.
The volatility of shocks, σa and σm, remained high in this period which could
revert the low performance of slack measures, but monetary policy appears
to be a stronger channel that dominates any positive eﬀect in this period.
Increasing openness should be another reason for lower forecast accuracy of
domestic slack.
In the 1980s where openness is highest, the open economy Phillips
curve-based forecast starts to outperform both the traditional Phillips curve
and the naive forecast. Global slack starts to perform well occasionally in late
1980s and at short horizons, which can be explained only by higher openness.
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Highly persistent and highly anti-inﬂationary policy during the Volcker era
(starting 1979) can be shown to weaken the accuracy of both domestic and
global slack in this era. The deterioration in forecast accuracy becomes more
serious when we also take into account the great moderation era starting in
mid-1980s, where the volatility of shocks decline. Our results are in line with
Benati and Surico (2008), who suggest, based on a time-varying VAR, that
inﬂation's predictability fell as the persistence of inﬂation and as the Taylor
rule coeﬃcient on the inﬂation gap rose during the Volcker era. We conﬁrm
these results under high inertia particularly in forecasts with domestic and
global slack measures.
• Terms of trade gap (HP-ﬁltered terms of trade and terms of trade ex. oil):
While in the empirical analysis we use HP-ﬁltered terms of trade and HP-
ﬁltered terms of trade ex. oil as proxies for the terms of trade gap, in the
NOEM framework we do not separate between these two variables and
therefore we only focus on HP-ﬁltered terms of trade in this section. HP-
ﬁltered terms of trade kicked in as a good forecast variable starting in late
50s and the performance went well until present except for a break with
the estimation samples starting in the early 1980s. The monetary policy
and openness experiments do not help us understand the performance of
this variable, while the good luck (asymmetric) experiment stands out
as the only relevant and important case that can explain the patterns in
Figures B.6-7. A suﬃciently high combination of the volatility shocks,
σa and σm, during 1960 and 1970s might have caused a high performance
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by HP-ﬁltered terms of trade (and in theory, terms of trade gap). In the
late 1970s, the volatility of shocks peaked, which might have caused the
variable to move to the insigniﬁcant region in Figure 8b. During the
Great Moderation era, the decline in the volatility of shocks might be
responsible for a weak performance.
Going back to the ﬁrst question raised in the previous section, we now
have a more clear understanding on what determines the accuracy of forecasts
with domestic and global slack measures. While globalization seems to be the
only channel to make global slack a better forecasting variable than domestic
slack, the conduct of monetary policy and particularly the monetary policy
inertia matter most in forecasting U.S. inﬂation can become a signiﬁcant de-
terminant of forecast accuracy of all other variables tested here.
We also understand to a great extent why terms of trade can be a good
forecasting variableit is basically due to good luck. Our simulated forecasts
obviously cannot explain the occasionally good performance of terms of trade
ex. oil and we leave this as an open question to be investigated in the future.
We also document an interesting puzzle regarding the forecasts with
domestic and global money supply growth, an alternating pattern in the rela-
tive MSFEs of the two variables especially until mid-1980s. This is one case
the current model cannot explain. We believe that a plausible explanation is
that the strong connection between the US and global money supply during
the Bretton Woods era might have weakened by the collapse of the system in
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1971 (therefore its relationship between US inﬂation also weakened) causing
the weak performance of G7 money supply growth during 1970s which was a
useful forecasting variable before the 1970s. Also, in a recent study, Sargent
and Surico (2011) provide results on the empirical evidence of the quantity
theory of money that may explain the performance of US money growth in
forecasting US inﬂation. Our empirical ﬁndings are consistent with their esti-
mates for 1970s where the quantity theory of money seemed to exist but then
broke down starting in late 1970s. We believe that the current model does not
help us see this connection exactly since the NOEM model does not capture a
strong role for money supply. However, this should not be viewed as a serious
issue since both domestic and global money growth seem to have lost their
signiﬁcances in forecasting U.S. inﬂation during the post-1984 period.
Finally, we still leave an open question on why the HP-ﬁltered slack
measures perform as good as the slack measures that are calculated with a
production function approach. While we believe that this question must be
handled with a more formal analysis (which will be left as future work) we
provide some interesting ﬁndings in Figures B.53-57. Lack of structural esti-
mates of output gap might be by-passed by using HP-ﬁltered output in certain
cases; however we show that it may not always be a good proxy for output
gap. Changes in the structural parameters of the models may signiﬁcantly
aﬀect the correlations between output gap and its HP-ﬁltered counterpart.
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2.5 Conclusion
Beating the naive forecasts of U.S. inﬂation with a traditional Phillips
curve speciﬁcation has become diﬃcult over the past three decades. The major
contribution of our paper is to help solve this problem, introducing a variable,
HP-ﬁltered terms of trade, to forecast U.S. inﬂation. We documented that it
yields highly accurate forecasts relative to the naive forecasts of U.S. inﬂation.
It also does well compared to forecasts with several conventional measures:
domestic slack, global slack, domestic money supply growth and global money
supply growth.
Our second contribution is to bring together and compare three chan-
nels regarding forecast accuracy that are widely discussed in the literature
-globalization, monetary policy and good luck- under a single NOEM frame-
work to explain our empirical ﬁndings. We provide three key insights: (i)
monetary policy inertia is an important parameter in raising the signiﬁcance
of a given variable to forecast U.S. inﬂation, and the conduct of monetary
policy appears to be the most important channel, (ii) volatilities of shocks to
productivity and money can be a particularly important determinant of the
accuracy of forecasts with HP-ﬁltered terms of trade (iii) and a combination
of these three channels might have improved the performance of HP-ﬁltered
terms of trade while deteriorating that of the Phillips curve-based forecasts
during the Great Moderation era.
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Appendix A
Appendix to chapter 1
A.1 List of countries
The following countries constitute the rest of the world:
1. Japan
2. Euro Area: Austria, Belgium, Cyprus, Estonia, Finland, France, Ger-
many, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Malta, the Netherlands, Por-
tugal, Slovakia, Slovenia, and Spain.
3. Oil Exporters: Algeria, Angola, Azerbaijan, Bahrain, Republic of Congo,
Ecuador, Equatorial Guinea, Gabon, I.R. of Iran, Kuwait, Libya, Nige-
ria, Norway, Oman, Qatar, Russia, Saudi Arabia, Syrian Arab Republic,
Turkmenistan, United Arab Emirates, Venezuela, and the Republic of
Yemen.
4. Emerging Asia: China, Hong Kong SAR, Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia,
the Phillipines, Singapore, Taiwan Province of China, and Thailand.
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A.2 Computational Algorithm
A.2.1 Pre-reform steady state:
I provide the algorithm for the case with inelastic labor supply.
1. Create grids on next period's assets and this period's shocks, (a′, ε).
Deﬁne a′A = {a1, a2, ..., aN} where a1 is the borrowing limit in each
country; and deﬁne the productivity shocks so that. ε E = {ε1,..., εM}.
2. Make a guess on the world interest rate, r. Notice that r ∈ (0, 1/β − 1).
Set values for D0 and D∗0. Given the tax rates, it is straightforward to
compute the implied K/N ratio and remaining factor prices for both
countries: rk, rk∗ , w and w∗.
3. Make a guess for the initial cumulative distribution of households over
assets and shocks, Γ0(a′, ε). A uniform distribution function is a good
guess.
4. Make an initial guess on tomorrow's consumption policy function, c0(a′, ε).
A good guess can be based on the budget constraint.
5. Construct the RHS of the Euler equation, for all pairs of (a′, ε)  A×E
RHS = β(1 + r)
∑
ε′E
Π(ε′|ε)Uc(c0(a′, ε))
6. Using the Euler equation, solve for today's consumption function alge-
braically. I.e. ﬁnd c˜ that solves
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Uc(c˜) = RHS
Note that this step makes the computation very eﬃcient and fast com-
pared to methods that require a nonlinear equation solver.
7. Using the budget constraint, compute today's asset holdings a¯(a′, ε) such
that
a¯(a′, ε) = [c˜+ a′ −Nw(1− τn)ε]/(1 + r) (A.1)
Hence, we ﬁnd today's assets given tomorrow's asset holding is a′ and
today's productivity shock is ε. Notice that a¯(a′, ε) is not necessarily on the
grids deﬁned in A, that is, the grids we ﬁnd now are endogenous grid points.
Update the initial guess for consumption as follows.
a. If a¯(a′, ε) causes the borrowing constraint to bind next period, com-
pute the new guess c˜0(a′, ε) using piecewise linear interpolation on the closest
grid points ai and aj such that, ai < a¯(a′, ε) < aj and using consumption rules
at c0(ai, ε) and c0(aj, ε).
b. If a¯(a′, ε) causes the borrowing constraint not to bind next period,
then set c˜0(a′, ε) = c˜ from step 6.
8. Check convergence for any asset grid and productivity shock, based on
the metric
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max{|c˜0(a′, ε)− c0(a′, ε)|} < ε
where ε is a small number. If convergence is not achieved, go to step 5.
9. Given the initial guess for distribution, Γ0(a′, ε), interpolate on grid
points ai and aj to ﬁnd the distribution over the endogenous grid points,
Γ(h−1a (a
′, ε)), ε). The inverse of the policy functions is already calcu-
lated in an earlier step, which makes this step also very eﬃcient. Hence
h−1a (at+1, εt) = a¯(a
′, ε). Then using the Markov transition matrix, ﬁnd
tomorrow's distribution
Γ(a′, ε′) =
∑
ε
Π(ε′|ε)Γ(a¯(a′, ε), ε)
Construct a metric as in step 8 to check convergence.
10. Repeat these steps for two countries, compute aggregate savings and
check whether global asset market clears. Update the interest rate, r
using bisection method.
11. Calculate the output level, and check if the public debt-to-GDP ratio is
satisﬁed. Then calculate the implied government expenditure, G.
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A.2.2 Transition and post-reform steady state:
1. Set T, the number of periods to converge to the new steady state.
2. Pick a new value for τ k. The new tax is imposed before the decisions are
made in period 1.
3. Make a guess for the path of Home capital stock, {Kt}T−1t=2 .Given that the
labor supply is inelastic, the implied series for factor prices and {K∗t }T−1t=2
can be obtained.
4. Using the government budget constraint for all periods, and for given
values of D0 and G, ﬁnd the new implied labor income tax, τn. It is
convenient to assume that DT = DT−1 as in Domeij and Heathcote
(2004).1
5. Having found τn, ﬁnd the sequence of government debt, {Dt}Tt=2. Repeat
this for Foreign.
6. Calculate the post-reform steady state, following the instructions in the
pre-reform steady state.
7. For both countries, solve for the household's optimization problem along
the transition path, starting from the ﬁnal steady state going backwards.
1A full shooting algorithm is explained in Mendoza and Tesar (1998). Their methodology
would require me to make a guess on the new τn, check whether the present value of
the government budget is satisﬁed and update τn if necessary. Given the complexity of
heterogeneous-agent incomplete markets models, the current technique is more conveniently
applied.
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Application of the endogenous grid point method is similar to the de-
scription in the pre-reform steady state above. Find the consumption
rules back until period 1. Find the implied asset holdings, and the post-
tax household distribution over assets and productivity shocks at period
1.
8. Then update the distributions forward, using the Markov transition ma-
trix and households' optimal saving decisions. Do the aggregations,
compute the implied sequence of capital stock {K˜t}T−1t=2 for Home using
K˜t = At −Dt + A∗t −K∗t −D∗t .
9. Check whether the inital path of capital stock has converged to the
implied series. If so, check whether T is suﬃciently large or not.
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Appendix B
Appendix to chapter 2
B.1 Data Description
Abbreviations
BEA = U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis; BLS = U.S. Bureau of La-
bor Statistics; BBK =German Federal Bank; BIS = Bank for International
Settlements; CAO = Cabinet Oﬃce (Japan); CBO = Congressional Budget
Oﬃce; FRB = Federal Reserve Board; FRBD = Federal Reserve Bank of
Dallas; FRED = Federal Reserve Economic Data (St. Louis Fed); IMF =
International Monetary Fund; INSEE = National Institute of Statistics and
Economic Studies (France); ISTAT = Istituto Nazionale Di Statistica (Italy);
OECD= Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development; OECD-
MEI= OECD Main Economic Indicators; ONS = Oﬃce for National Statis-
tics (UK); SAAR = Seasonally adjusted at an annual rate; SA=Seasonally
adjusted; SCAN = Statistics Canada
All series are quarterly unless indicated otherwise and obtained from
Haver Analytics. In general, we indicate the original source if the series is
available outside Haver Analytics. While we try to be consistent in terms
of the deﬁnitions across countries, under cases in which data availability is
limited, we use the series with the closest deﬁnition.
1. Price indices
Series used for U.S. inﬂation: All series are seasonally adjusted. Start
dates of the series vary across diﬀerent measures and they all end in 2011:4.
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Base years and start dates of each series are indicated in parentheses. We take
CPI (all items) (82-82=100, 1947:1) from the BLS, core CPI (all items ex. food
and energy) (82-84=100, 1957:1) from the BLS, GDP implicit price deﬂator
(82-84=100, 1947:1) from the BEA; PCE chain price index (2005=100, 1959:1)
from the BEA, trimmed mean PCE chain price index (2004-5=100, 1977:1)
from FRBD and PPI (ﬁnished goods) (1982=100, 1947:2) from the BLS. Series
used for terms of trade gaps: We use exports and imports under the heading
`price indexes for GDP' in National Income and Product Accounts in BEA to
calculate U.S. terms of trade. Both series are seasonally adjusted, with the
base year 2005=100 and cover periods 1947:1-2011:4. Terms of trade series is
calculated as 100 ×export price index/import price index. Terms of trade gap
is the HP-ﬁltered (λ = 1600) terms of trade series. Terms of trade gap ex.
oil is calculated similarly (with the same base year and seasonally adjusted),
using imports of non-petroleum goods (chain price index) and exports of goods
(chain price index) from BEA (1967:2-2011:4).
2. Monetary aggregates
All series are seasonally adjusted and quarterly (end-of-period aggre-
gates of monthly series). For UK and U.S., we have M4 and M2 data available
from OECD and FRB (1963:1-2011:4), respectively. For other countries, data
become limited for certain periods and sources and therefore we splice two se-
ries. Therefore we obtain M3 for Canada from BIS (1962:1-1981:4) and OECD
(1982:1- 2011:4); M2 for Germany from BIS (1963:1-1990:4) and BBK (1980:1-
2011:4); M2 for Italy from Bank of Italy (1963:1-1997:1/1997:2-2011:4); M2 for
Japan from Bank of Japan (1963:1-1966:4) and FRED (1967:1-2011:4). For
France, we splice M2R and M3 from BIS (1963:1-1969:4 and 1970:1-2011:4,
respectively). For France, Germany and Italy, the ﬁrst part of the series is
converted from the national currency to Euros using the European Currency
Unit (1999).
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3. Slack measures
All measures used cover the period 1980:1-2011:4 unless stated other-
wise.
CBO U.S. slack: Deﬁned as `Output Gap in Percentage of Real GDP',
and is calculated as
100× (RPGDPt −RGDPt)
RGDPt
where RPGDPt and RGDPt are real potential GDP and real GDP at quarter
t, respectively (SAAR, Billions of Chained 2005 Dollars). We take our real
GDP series from BEA and real potential GDP series from CBO. U.S. HP-
ﬁltered series is simply quarterly U.S. real GDP series with HP ﬁlter (λ = 1600)
applied. Then the logs of the cyclical component is taken and multiplied by
100.
FRBD U.S. slack: The series is constructed by the FRBD, and the
methodology can be described as follows. First, the Phillips Curve is estimated
with annualized quarterly inﬂation (speciﬁcally, core CPI) and unemployment
rate/capacity utilization rate. The regression equation for this is speciﬁed as
is constructed as follows.
The regression is speciﬁed as
pit = α1 + α2pit−1 + α3pit−2 + α4pit−3 + (1− α2 − α3 − α4)pit−4 + α5urt + t
where pit = 400× log(pt/pt−1), pt is the price index, urt is unemployment rate
where we deﬁne the potential unemployment rate as ur∗ = −αˆ1/αˆ5. We run a
similar regression with capacity utilization rate, caput and deﬁne the potential
rate of capacity utilization, capu∗ = −αˆ1/αˆ5, similarly.
Then the slack measure is computed as follows by running the following
regression
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pit+4 − pit = −β1(urt − ur∗) + (1− β1)(caput − capu∗) + t
and the slack measure is calculated as slackt = −βˆ1(urt − ur∗) + (1−
βˆ1)(caput − capu∗).
FRBD G7 slack: Produced by the FRBD and calculated by applying
the procedure described above for each member of the G7 economies. After
obtaining the `domestic slack measure for a given country, the GDP shares of
each country is calculated so that for country i at quarter t, sharei,t=GDPi,t
/
∑
iGDPi,t. The G7 slack is the GDP-weighted average of the slack measures
of individual countries.
The data series we use here are as follows:
• GDP series to construct the GDP shares of each country (sources in-
dicated in parentheses): Canada (SCAN), France (INSEE), Germany
(BBK), Italy (ISTAT), Japan (CAO), UK (ONS), U.S. (BEA).
All series are in billions of U.S. Dollars, seasonally adjusted (1978:1-
2011:4). For France, Germany and Italy, the series are working day adjusted.
• Manufacturing capacity utilization rates (%) come from manufacturing
surveys, covering the period 1978:1-2011:4 and are seasonally adjusted
for the following countries: France, Germany and U.S. For Italy, the
data come from OECDMEI; for Japan, we use manufacturing opera-
tion rate; for Canada, we do splicing for capacity utilization rate from
OECDMEI (1978:1-1986:4) and the manufacturing survey from SCAN
(1987:1-2011:4); while we apply a similar procedure for UK with ca-
pacity utilization rate series from Datastream (1978:1-1985:1) and the
manufacturing survey from OECDMEI (1985:2-2011:4).
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• As a measure of inﬂation, we use core CPI. All series are seasonally
adjusted, come from OECDMEI and the base year is 2005=100 for all
countries with the exception that the base year is 2010=100 for Japan
and 82-84=100 for the U.S..
FRBD G39 Slack: This measure is calculated by HP ﬁltering (λ =
1600) of FRBD G39 index which uses constant 2005 (PPP adjusted) weights to
aggregate GDP series of the 39 countries: Argentina, Australia, Austria, Bel-
gium, Brazil, Canada, China, Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, France, Ger-
many, Greece, Hong Kong, Hungary, India, Indonesia, Italy, Ireland, Japan,
Korea, Luxembourg, Malaysia, Mexico, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway,
Peru, Poland, Singapore, South Africa, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Taiwan,
Thailand, Turkey, UK and U.S. GDP series used are quarterly; and for some
countries for which only disaggregated (annual) data are available, we apply
quadratic match average method to interpolate these series. We use 2005 PPP
data from the IMF.
IMF U.S. and IMF Advanced Slack: Both slack measures are de-
ﬁned as `Output Gap in Percentage of Real GDP (%)' for the U.S. and for
a group of advanced countries (Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Cyprus,
Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Nether-
lands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, UK and U.S.). These
measures are published by IMF WEO, annually and available between 1980-
2011. Therefore we interpolate the series by `quadratic match average' method
to disaggregate into quarterly frequency.
OECD U.S., OECD G7 and OECD Total Slack: All three mea-
sures are deﬁned as the `Output Gap of the Total Economy (%)', published by
OECD Economic Outlook. OECD Total consists of 30 OECD countries: Aus-
tralia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland,
France, Germany, Greece, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Korea, Luxembourg,
Mexico, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Slovakia, Spain, Swe-
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den, Switzerland, Turkey, UK and U.S. and the series go back to 1970:4.
U.S. HP-ﬁltered GDP: Calculated using quarterly U.S. real GDP
series from BEA. First, the logs of the series is taken and multiplied by 100
and then Hodrick-Prescott ﬁlter (λ = 1600) is applied.
B.2 Tables and Figures
95
R
e
la
ti
v
e
M
S
F
E
s
1
9
9
2
Q
1
:2
0
1
1
Q
4
H
o
ri
zo
n
1
4
6
8
1
0
1
2
1
4
6
8
1
0
1
2
C
o
n
su
m
e
r
P
ri
ce
In
d
e
x
C
o
n
su
m
e
r
P
ri
ce
In
d
e
x
(e
x
.
F
o
o
d
&
E
n
e
rg
y
)
A
R
4.
70
4
1.
88
1
1.
33
4
1.
16
4
1.
06
5
0.
95
8
0.
29
5
0.
41
8
0.
62
6
0.
82
8
0.
95
4
1.
03
6
C
B
O
0.
99
0∗
1.
04
2
1.
05
9
1.
07
0
1.
10
0
1.
16
8
1.
13
5
0.
97
4∗
0.
87
3∗
∗
0.
82
7∗
∗
0.
84
0∗
∗
0.
87
0∗
F
R
B
D
0.
87
8∗
∗∗
0.
93
6∗
0.
92
4∗
0.
93
6∗
1.
00
1
1.
07
3
1.
33
3∗
0.
95
5∗
∗
0.
78
8∗
∗
0.
73
7∗
∗
0.
73
3∗
∗
0.
75
1∗
∗
IM
F
1.
00
5
1.
05
4
1.
06
8
1.
07
2
1.
10
1
1.
17
0
1.
06
0
1.
11
0
1.
10
6
1.
08
2
1.
07
3
1.
07
9
O
E
C
D
0.
98
4∗
1.
02
8
1.
03
8
1.
04
6
1.
06
8
1.
11
8
1.
01
8
0.
80
1∗
∗∗
0.
74
1∗
∗∗
0.
73
9∗
∗
0.
76
8∗
∗
0.
79
8∗
∗
H
P
-ﬁ
lt
.
0.
99
7
1.
04
5
1.
03
6
1.
02
2
1.
03
2
1.
06
9
1.
10
3
0.
91
6∗
∗
0.
85
1∗
∗
0.
83
8∗
∗
0.
86
1∗
∗
0.
88
2∗
M
o
n
ey
0.
99
6
1.
01
7
1.
03
0
1.
07
5
1.
10
0
1.
14
7
1.
02
7
0.
96
9
0.
89
3
0.
89
8
0.
92
0
0.
92
3
P
C
E
P
ri
ce
In
d
e
x
T
ri
m
m
e
d
M
e
a
n
P
C
E
P
ri
ce
In
d
e
x
A
R
2.
32
9
1.
19
0
0.
93
0
0.
88
5
0.
87
5
0.
89
9
0.
14
2
0.
16
9
0.
22
9
0.
31
3
0.
38
6
0.
43
6
C
B
O
0.
99
9
1.
02
6
1.
04
1
1.
05
1
1.
06
9
1.
08
2
0.
96
0∗
∗
0.
88
2∗
∗
0.
86
9∗
∗
0.
88
7∗
0.
90
4∗
0.
92
2∗
F
R
B
D
1.
00
6
1.
03
2
1.
03
7
1.
03
0
1.
02
4
1.
02
3
0.
93
3∗
∗∗
0.
88
8∗
∗
0.
82
6∗
∗
0.
82
2∗
∗
0.
82
2∗
∗
0.
80
8∗
∗
IM
F
1.
00
5
1.
02
4
1.
03
2
1.
03
8
1.
05
5
1.
06
7
1.
01
8
1.
04
7
1.
02
9
1.
01
8
1.
00
4
0.
98
6
O
E
C
D
0.
99
5
1.
01
2
1.
02
0
1.
02
7
1.
04
0
1.
04
8
0.
89
9∗
∗∗
0.
79
8∗
∗∗
0.
82
0∗
∗
0.
86
0∗
∗
0.
89
0∗
0.
91
8
H
P
-ﬁ
lt
.
1.
00
4
1.
02
0
1.
01
8
1.
02
4
1.
03
8
1.
04
5
0.
93
2∗
∗∗
0.
90
4∗
∗
0.
92
2∗
0.
93
9∗
0.
95
4
0.
95
9
M
o
n
ey
1.
00
2
1.
02
0
1.
04
5
1.
07
8
1.
09
1
1.
12
5
1.
01
7
1.
07
0
1.
08
4
1.
10
9
1.
12
3
1.
13
1
G
D
P
D
e
ﬂ
a
to
r
P
ro
d
u
ce
r
P
ri
ce
In
d
e
x
A
R
0.
50
8
0.
37
6
0.
42
3
0.
49
8
0.
54
5
0.
57
5
19
.4
31
7.
82
9
4.
72
4
3.
12
7
2.
20
7
1.
78
6
C
B
O
1.
00
5
0.
99
6
1.
03
0
1.
04
0
1.
05
5
1.
06
6
0.
98
0∗
1.
00
7
1.
03
2
1.
03
9
1.
07
3
1.
11
9
F
R
B
D
0.
94
9∗
∗
0.
91
0∗
∗
0.
96
2∗
0.
99
7
1.
03
6
1.
05
0
1.
00
5
1.
06
4
1.
10
2
1.
13
7
1.
18
8
1.
25
0
IM
F
1.
03
7
1.
05
7
1.
05
9
1.
04
8
1.
05
7
1.
06
5
0.
99
6
1.
02
4
1.
05
3
1.
08
2
1.
14
3
1.
22
7
O
E
C
D
0.
97
0∗
∗
0.
95
1∗
0.
99
9
1.
02
2
1.
03
7
1.
04
7
0.
97
4∗
∗
0.
98
9
1.
00
1
0.
99
9
1.
00
6
1.
01
3
H
P
-ﬁ
lt
.
1.
01
3
1.
03
2
1.
04
2
1.
03
1
1.
04
6
1.
05
6
0.
90
9∗
∗∗
0.
98
0∗
1.
01
6
1.
03
0
1.
07
3
1.
11
6
M
o
n
ey
1.
00
4
1.
03
3
1.
05
7
1.
07
4
1.
09
0
1.
10
8
1.
00
0
1.
01
1
1.
03
5
1.
06
8
1.
10
1
1.
15
7
T
ab
le
B
.1
:
B
en
ch
m
ar
k
sa
m
pl
e
fo
re
ca
st
s
w
it
h
U
S
sl
ac
k
an
d
m
on
ey
gr
ow
th
T
h
is
ta
b
le
re
p
o
rt
s
th
e
fo
re
c
a
st
in
g
p
e
rf
o
rm
a
n
c
e
s
w
it
h
a
n
e
st
im
a
ti
o
n
sa
m
p
le
c
o
v
e
ri
n
g
1
9
8
0
Q
1
:1
9
9
1
Q
4
a
n
d
a
p
se
u
d
o
o
u
t-
o
f-
sa
m
p
le
fo
re
c
a
st
in
g
sa
m
p
le
o
v
e
r
1
9
9
2
Q
1
:2
0
1
1
Q
4
.
T
h
e
ﬁ
rs
t
ro
w
o
f
e
a
c
h
p
a
n
e
l
sh
o
w
s
th
e
M
S
F
E
s
o
f
fo
re
c
a
st
s
w
it
h
th
e
si
m
p
le
u
n
iv
a
ri
a
te
A
R
p
ro
c
e
ss
o
f
in
ﬂ
a
ti
o
n
(r
e
st
ri
c
te
d
m
o
d
e
l)
a
n
d
a
re
th
e
re
fo
re
in
a
b
so
lu
te
te
rm
s.
T
h
e
se
c
o
n
d
e
n
tr
y
in
e
a
c
h
p
a
n
e
l
re
p
o
rt
s
th
e
re
la
ti
v
e
M
S
F
E
s
o
f
th
e
u
n
iv
a
ri
a
te
fo
re
c
a
st
s
w
it
h
te
rm
s
o
f
tr
a
d
e
.
T
h
e
re
m
a
in
in
g
e
n
tr
ie
s
a
re
th
e
M
S
F
E
s
o
f
th
e
b
iv
a
ri
a
te
fo
re
c
a
st
s
re
la
ti
v
e
to
th
e
M
S
F
E
s
o
f
th
e
re
st
ri
c
te
d
m
o
d
e
l.
A
st
e
ri
sk
s
d
e
n
o
te
th
a
t
th
e
re
la
ti
v
e
M
S
F
E
s
a
re
st
a
ti
st
ic
a
ll
y
d
iﬀ
e
re
n
t
a
n
d
(m
o
re
a
c
c
u
ra
te
)
th
a
n
th
e
M
S
F
E
s
o
f
th
e
re
st
ri
c
te
d
m
o
d
e
l
a
t
1
(*
*
*
),
5
(*
*
),
a
n
d
1
0
(*
)
p
e
rc
e
n
t
si
g
n
iﬁ
c
a
n
c
e
le
v
e
ls
.
96
R
e
la
ti
v
e
M
S
F
E
s
1
9
9
2
Q
1
:2
0
1
1
Q
4
H
o
ri
zo
n
1
4
6
8
1
0
1
2
1
4
6
8
1
0
1
2
C
o
n
su
m
e
r
P
ri
ce
In
d
e
x
C
o
n
su
m
e
r
P
ri
ce
In
d
e
x
(e
x
.
F
o
o
d
&
E
n
e
rg
y
)
A
R
4.
70
4
1.
88
1
1.
33
4
1.
16
4
1.
06
5
0.
95
8
0.
29
5
0.
41
8
0.
62
6
0.
82
8
0.
95
4
1.
03
6
F
R
B
D
G
7
0.
97
7∗
1.
04
9
1.
01
4
1.
01
7
1.
04
9
1.
07
6
0.
94
7∗
∗
0.
91
2∗
∗
0.
77
6∗
∗
0.
74
0∗
∗
0.
74
5∗
∗
0.
76
9∗
∗
F
R
B
D
G
3
9
1.
00
8
1.
08
0
1.
07
6
1.
06
7
1.
08
1
1.
13
5
1.
16
5
0.
90
5∗
∗
0.
87
2∗
∗
0.
87
1∗
∗
0.
88
9∗
0.
90
6∗
IM
F
A
d
v
.
1.
00
5
1.
05
0
1.
05
4
1.
04
6
1.
04
1
1.
05
9
1.
01
8
1.
05
4
1.
05
8
1.
03
9
1.
02
3
1.
01
4
O
E
C
D
G
7
0.
98
1
1.
03
6
1.
04
9
1.
06
0
1.
06
7
1.
08
7
0.
90
5∗
∗∗
0.
76
9∗
∗∗
0.
68
0∗
∗∗
0.
66
8∗
∗∗
0.
69
9∗
∗
0.
73
5∗
∗
O
E
C
D
T
o
t.
0.
98
9∗
1.
04
5
1.
06
1
1.
07
3
1.
08
1
1.
10
1
0.
96
8∗
∗
0.
81
6∗
∗∗
0.
70
1∗
∗∗
0.
67
7∗
∗∗
0.
70
3∗
∗
0.
73
8∗
∗
G
7
M
o
n
ey
1.
02
0
0.
96
2∗
0.
91
9∗
∗
0.
89
2∗
∗
0.
83
5∗
∗
0.
77
9∗
∗∗
1.
02
7
0.
96
9∗
0.
89
3∗
∗
0.
89
8∗
∗
0.
92
0∗
0.
92
3∗
P
C
E
P
ri
ce
In
d
e
x
T
ri
m
m
e
d
M
e
a
n
P
C
E
P
ri
ce
In
d
e
x
A
R
2.
32
9
1.
19
0
0.
93
0
0.
88
5
0.
87
5
0.
89
9
0.
14
2
0.
16
9
0.
22
9
0.
31
3
0.
38
6
0.
43
6
F
R
B
D
G
7
0.
93
4∗
∗∗
1.
05
9
1.
04
5
1.
08
3
1.
13
0
1.
13
1
1.
00
1
0.
89
5∗
∗
0.
83
0∗
∗
0.
84
5∗
∗
0.
86
9∗
0.
89
1∗
F
R
B
D
G
3
9
1.
00
9
1.
02
9
1.
02
6
1.
03
9
1.
06
3
1.
07
9
0.
99
4∗
0.
87
5∗
∗
0.
84
7∗
∗
0.
87
9∗
∗
0.
88
5∗
0.
89
1∗
IM
F
A
d
v
.
1.
00
6
1.
01
3
0.
99
3
0.
97
7
0.
96
6
0.
96
0
0.
97
5∗
∗
0.
70
7∗
∗∗
0.
65
9∗
∗∗
0.
67
7∗
∗∗
0.
70
7∗
∗
0.
75
7∗
∗
O
E
C
D
G
7
0.
99
4
1.
01
8
1.
01
8
1.
01
7
1.
01
6
1.
01
4
0.
87
0
0.
68
6
0.
70
1
0.
76
4
0.
82
3
0.
87
8
O
E
C
D
T
o
t.
0.
99
9
1.
02
4
1.
02
3
1.
02
2
1.
02
2
1.
02
1
0.
91
4
0.
70
4
0.
69
6
0.
76
4
0.
83
6
0.
89
8
G
7
M
o
n
ey
1.
02
8
0.
90
3∗
∗
0.
91
5∗
∗
0.
88
9∗
∗
0.
82
0∗
∗∗
0.
79
6∗
∗∗
0.
98
2∗
1.
00
4
1.
05
4
1.
06
8
1.
05
9
1.
06
6
G
D
P
D
e
ﬂ
a
to
r
P
ro
d
u
ce
r
P
ri
ce
In
d
e
x
A
R
0.
50
8
0.
37
6
0.
42
3
0.
49
8
0.
54
5
0.
57
5
19
.4
31
7.
82
9
4.
72
4
3.
12
7
2.
20
7
1.
78
6
F
R
B
D
G
7
1.
05
3
0.
98
9
0.
99
1
1.
01
3
1.
05
9
1.
07
4
1.
00
9
1.
05
0
1.
05
2
1.
06
1
1.
05
0
1.
02
3
F
R
B
D
G
3
9
1.
05
6
1.
07
8
1.
06
7
1.
04
4
1.
07
2
1.
09
4
0.
94
7∗
∗
1.
04
6
1.
07
4
1.
15
4
1.
31
3
1.
38
9
IM
F
A
d
v
0.
99
6
0.
78
0∗
∗∗
0.
81
1∗
∗
0.
88
7∗
0.
95
1
1.
00
0
0.
99
0∗
1.
02
0
1.
05
1
1.
07
8
1.
10
6
1.
13
4
O
E
C
D
G
7
0.
99
2
1.
00
1
1.
02
6
1.
02
6
1.
02
9
1.
02
9
0.
96
4∗
∗
0.
99
4
1.
01
8
1.
03
1
1.
03
9
1.
03
4
O
E
C
D
T
o
t.
1.
00
5
1.
01
5
1.
03
5
1.
03
2
1.
03
7
1.
03
8
0.
97
1∗
∗
1.
00
3
1.
02
7
1.
04
0
1.
04
7
1.
04
1
G
7
M
o
n
ey
1.
00
9
1.
01
2
1.
00
6
0.
98
8
0.
95
0
0.
92
7
1.
02
3
1.
00
9
1.
00
5
1.
01
8
1.
05
6
1.
04
8
T
ab
le
B
.2
:
B
en
ch
m
ar
k
sa
m
pl
e
fo
re
ca
st
s
w
it
h
gl
ob
al
sl
ac
k
an
d
m
on
ey
gr
ow
th
T
h
is
ta
b
le
re
p
o
rt
s
th
e
fo
re
c
a
st
in
g
p
e
rf
o
rm
a
n
c
e
s
w
it
h
a
n
e
st
im
a
ti
o
n
sa
m
p
le
c
o
v
e
ri
n
g
1
9
8
0
Q
1
:1
9
9
1
Q
4
a
n
d
a
p
se
u
d
o
o
u
t-
o
f-
sa
m
p
le
fo
re
c
a
st
in
g
sa
m
p
le
o
v
e
r
1
9
9
2
Q
1
:2
0
1
1
Q
4
.
T
h
e
ﬁ
rs
t
ro
w
o
f
e
a
c
h
p
a
n
e
l
sh
o
w
s
th
e
M
S
F
E
s
o
f
fo
re
c
a
st
s
w
it
h
th
e
si
m
p
le
u
n
iv
a
ri
a
te
A
R
p
ro
c
e
ss
o
f
in
ﬂ
a
ti
o
n
(r
e
st
ri
c
te
d
m
o
d
e
l)
a
n
d
a
re
th
e
re
fo
re
in
a
b
so
lu
te
te
rm
s.
T
h
e
se
c
o
n
d
e
n
tr
y
in
e
a
c
h
p
a
n
e
l
re
p
o
rt
s
th
e
re
la
ti
v
e
M
S
F
E
s
o
f
th
e
u
n
iv
a
ri
a
te
fo
re
c
a
st
s
w
it
h
te
rm
s
o
f
tr
a
d
e
.
T
h
e
re
m
a
in
in
g
e
n
tr
ie
s
a
re
th
e
M
S
F
E
s
o
f
th
e
b
iv
a
ri
a
te
fo
re
c
a
st
s
re
la
ti
v
e
to
th
e
M
S
F
E
s
o
f
th
e
re
st
ri
c
te
d
m
o
d
e
l.
A
st
e
ri
sk
s
d
e
n
o
te
th
a
t
th
e
re
la
ti
v
e
M
S
F
E
s
a
re
st
a
ti
st
ic
a
ll
y
d
iﬀ
e
re
n
t
a
n
d
(m
o
re
a
c
c
u
ra
te
)
th
a
n
th
e
M
S
F
E
s
o
f
th
e
re
st
ri
c
te
d
m
o
d
e
l
a
t
1
(*
*
*
),
5
(*
*
),
a
n
d
1
0
(*
)
p
e
rc
e
n
t
si
g
n
iﬁ
c
a
n
c
e
le
v
e
ls
.
97
R
e
la
ti
v
e
M
S
F
E
s
1
9
9
2
Q
1
:2
0
1
1
Q
4
H
o
ri
zo
n
1
4
6
8
1
0
1
2
1
4
6
8
1
0
1
2
C
o
n
su
m
e
r
P
ri
ce
In
d
e
x
C
o
n
su
m
e
r
P
ri
ce
In
d
e
x
(e
x
.
F
o
o
d
&
E
n
e
rg
y
)
A
R
4.
70
4
1.
88
1
1.
33
4
1.
16
4
1.
06
5
0.
95
8
0.
29
5
0.
41
8
0.
62
6
0.
82
8
0.
95
4
1.
03
6
T
o
T
0.
96
3∗
∗
0.
93
7∗
∗
1.
05
5
1.
13
2
1.
24
7
1.
31
2
1.
12
0
1.
22
1
1.
17
3
1.
08
6
1.
05
7
1.
06
1
C
B
O
&
T
o
T
0.
98
1∗
1.
01
6
1.
22
7
1.
33
9
1.
50
8
1.
62
3
1.
17
9
1.
13
3
1.
03
0∗
0.
92
9∗
∗
0.
92
1∗
0.
95
8∗
F
R
B
D
&
T
o
T
0.
90
3∗
∗∗
0.
98
7∗
1.
17
7
1.
28
3
1.
46
1
1.
56
8
1.
30
2
1.
01
5
0.
87
2
0.
81
0∗
0.
80
2∗
0.
82
9
IM
F
&
T
o
T
0.
99
5∗
∗
1.
01
1∗
1.
21
5
1.
33
2
1.
50
4
1.
61
2
1.
03
0
1.
00
9
0.
92
2∗
0.
87
9∗
∗
0.
87
3∗
0.
88
5∗
O
E
C
D
&
T
o
T
0.
97
3∗
∗
0.
98
6∗
1.
18
7
1.
29
5
1.
45
6
1.
55
7
1.
07
9
0.
97
4∗
0.
90
4∗
0.
84
3∗
∗
0.
85
1∗
0.
89
0∗
H
P
-ﬁ
lt
.&
T
o
T
0.
99
2∗
∗
1.
03
4
1.
21
6
1.
29
2
1.
45
3
1.
55
8
1.
22
5
1.
13
7
1.
02
1
0.
92
6∗
0.
92
6∗
0.
95
5
U
S
M
o
n
ey
&
T
o
T
0.
95
3∗
∗
0.
97
4∗
1.
09
8
1.
21
5
1.
35
1
1.
44
8
1.
11
6
1.
32
7
1.
30
5
1.
22
8
1.
21
8
1.
24
8
G
7
M
o
n
ey
&
T
o
T
1.
01
4
1.
00
5
1.
09
6
1.
16
9
1.
22
1
1.
20
6
1.
12
7
1.
16
1
1.
05
0
0.
98
4
0.
98
7
1.
00
7
P
C
E
P
ri
ce
In
d
e
x
T
ri
m
m
e
d
M
e
a
n
P
C
E
P
ri
ce
In
d
e
x
A
R
2.
32
9
1.
19
0
0.
93
0
0.
88
5
0.
87
5
0.
89
9
0.
14
2
0.
16
9
0.
22
9
0.
31
3
0.
38
6
0.
43
6
T
o
T
0.
91
6∗
∗∗
0.
89
2∗
∗
0.
97
4
1.
11
6
1.
25
2
1.
28
3
0.
96
3
0.
91
1∗
∗
0.
86
4∗
∗
0.
82
8∗
∗∗
0.
83
3∗
∗
0.
84
3∗
∗
C
B
O
&
T
o
T
0.
89
9
0.
88
3
0.
98
0
1.
12
6
1.
27
4
1.
31
8
1.
05
3
0.
87
3∗
∗
0.
77
7∗
∗∗
0.
79
0∗
∗
0.
78
4∗
∗
0.
78
3∗
∗
F
R
B
D
&
T
o
T
0.
90
7
0.
89
8
0.
98
9
1.
13
9
1.
27
6
1.
30
5
0.
95
0∗
∗
0.
89
9∗
∗
0.
82
8∗
∗
0.
80
3∗
∗
0.
83
4∗
∗
0.
86
7∗
IM
F
&
T
o
T
0.
91
2∗
∗∗
0.
88
2∗
∗
0.
97
6∗
1.
12
8
1.
27
8
1.
31
9
1.
02
9
0.
96
7∗
0.
87
7∗
∗
0.
84
3∗
∗
0.
84
8∗
∗
0.
86
3∗
O
E
C
D
&
T
o
T
0.
89
6∗
∗∗
0.
87
3∗
∗
0.
96
5∗
1.
10
8
1.
25
1
1.
29
3
0.
99
2∗
∗
0.
80
9∗
∗∗
0.
74
2∗
∗∗
0.
76
8∗
∗
0.
76
8∗
∗
0.
77
4∗
H
P
-ﬁ
lt
.&
T
o
T
0.
91
6∗
∗∗
0.
91
7∗
∗
1.
00
4
1.
15
3
1.
30
2
1.
34
1
1.
00
1∗
0.
89
2∗
∗
0.
80
2∗
∗
0.
80
4∗
∗
0.
78
8∗
∗
0.
76
5∗
∗
U
S
M
o
n
ey
&
T
o
T
0.
90
9∗
∗∗
0.
95
6∗
1.
08
9
1.
30
3
1.
45
9
1.
47
9
1.
03
9
0.
97
2
0.
89
0
0.
91
4
0.
90
2
0.
85
4
G
7
M
o
n
ey
&
T
o
T
0.
98
0∗
∗
0.
87
6∗
∗
0.
98
6
1.
08
8
1.
14
4
1.
15
7
1.
04
4
0.
94
6∗
0.
89
8∗
∗
0.
90
7∗
0.
88
6∗
0.
85
3∗
∗
G
D
P
D
e
ﬂ
a
to
r
P
ro
d
u
ce
r
P
ri
ce
In
d
e
x
A
R
0.
50
8
0.
37
6
0.
42
3
0.
49
8
0.
54
5
0.
57
5
19
.4
31
7.
82
9
4.
72
4
3.
12
7
2.
20
7
1.
78
6
T
o
T
1.
07
2
1.
15
5
1.
12
9
1.
10
5
1.
15
8
1.
20
0
0.
96
8∗
∗
0.
96
7∗
1.
03
4
1.
14
1
1.
31
5
1.
37
7
C
B
O
&
T
o
T
1.
02
8
1.
02
7
1.
10
8
1.
13
3
1.
19
9
1.
26
1
0.
96
5∗
∗
0.
99
7
1.
08
5
1.
20
7
1.
43
1
1.
55
0
F
R
B
D
&
T
o
T
0.
98
2
1.
08
9
1.
13
9
1.
14
1
1.
20
6
1.
25
5
0.
98
0∗
∗
1.
04
0
1.
14
5
1.
30
4
1.
55
0
1.
67
6
IM
F
&
T
o
T
1.
08
8
1.
16
3
1.
15
0
1.
12
5
1.
17
8
1.
22
6
0.
97
1∗
∗
0.
99
9
1.
10
1
1.
25
9
1.
53
0
1.
68
7
O
E
C
D
&
T
o
T
0.
98
8
0.
99
3
1.
08
6
1.
12
3
1.
18
9
1.
24
7
0.
96
1∗
∗
0.
96
9∗
1.
03
9
1.
14
6
1.
33
5
1.
40
9
H
P
-ﬁ
lt
.&
T
o
T
1.
05
3
1.
11
0
1.
15
8
1.
15
4
1.
21
2
1.
26
0
0.
97
0∗
∗
1.
01
1
1.
09
1
1.
22
6
1.
46
7
1.
60
2
U
S
M
o
n
ey
&
T
o
T
1.
08
1
1.
25
2
1.
23
1
1.
22
4
1.
26
9
1.
30
6
0.
96
1∗
∗
0.
97
1∗
1.
07
8
1.
24
8
1.
47
9
1.
58
2
G
7
M
o
n
ey
&
T
o
T
1.
07
7
1.
19
0
1.
17
1
1.
12
4
1.
14
2
1.
17
1
1.
00
8
1.
00
3
1.
05
9
1.
17
8
1.
37
2
1.
41
1
T
ab
le
B
.3
:
B
en
ch
m
ar
k
sa
m
pl
e
fo
re
ca
st
s
w
it
h
do
m
es
ti
c
va
ri
ab
le
s
an
d
te
rm
s
of
tr
ad
e
T
h
is
ta
b
le
re
p
o
rt
s
th
e
fo
re
c
a
st
in
g
p
e
rf
o
rm
a
n
c
e
s
w
it
h
a
n
e
st
im
a
ti
o
n
sa
m
p
le
c
o
v
e
ri
n
g
1
9
8
0
Q
1
:1
9
9
1
Q
4
a
n
d
a
p
se
u
d
o
o
u
t-
o
f-
sa
m
p
le
fo
re
c
a
st
in
g
sa
m
p
le
o
v
e
r
1
9
9
2
Q
1
:2
0
1
1
Q
4
.
T
h
e
ﬁ
rs
t
ro
w
o
f
e
a
c
h
p
a
n
e
l
sh
o
w
s
th
e
M
S
F
E
s
o
f
fo
re
c
a
st
s
w
it
h
th
e
si
m
p
le
u
n
iv
a
ri
a
te
A
R
p
ro
c
e
ss
o
f
in
ﬂ
a
ti
o
n
(r
e
st
ri
c
te
d
m
o
d
e
l)
a
n
d
a
re
th
e
re
fo
re
in
a
b
so
lu
te
te
rm
s.
T
h
e
se
c
o
n
d
e
n
tr
y
in
e
a
c
h
p
a
n
e
l
re
p
o
rt
s
th
e
re
la
ti
v
e
M
S
F
E
s
o
f
th
e
u
n
iv
a
ri
a
te
fo
re
c
a
st
s
w
it
h
te
rm
s
o
f
tr
a
d
e
.
T
h
e
re
m
a
in
in
g
e
n
tr
ie
s
a
re
th
e
M
S
F
E
s
o
f
th
e
b
iv
a
ri
a
te
fo
re
c
a
st
s
re
la
ti
v
e
to
th
e
M
S
F
E
s
o
f
th
e
re
st
ri
c
te
d
m
o
d
e
l.
A
st
e
ri
sk
s
d
e
n
o
te
th
a
t
th
e
re
la
ti
v
e
M
S
F
E
s
a
re
st
a
ti
st
ic
a
ll
y
d
iﬀ
e
re
n
t
a
n
d
(m
o
re
a
c
c
u
ra
te
)
th
a
n
th
e
M
S
F
E
s
o
f
th
e
re
st
ri
c
te
d
m
o
d
e
l
a
t
1
(*
*
*
),
5
(*
*
),
a
n
d
1
0
(*
)
p
e
rc
e
n
t
si
g
n
iﬁ
c
a
n
c
e
le
v
e
ls
.
98
R
e
la
ti
v
e
M
S
F
E
s
1
9
9
2
Q
1
:2
0
1
1
Q
4
H
o
ri
zo
n
1
4
6
8
1
0
1
2
1
4
6
8
1
0
1
2
C
o
n
su
m
e
r
P
ri
ce
In
d
e
x
C
o
n
su
m
e
r
P
ri
ce
In
d
e
x
(e
x
.
F
o
o
d
&
E
n
e
rg
y
)
A
R
4.
70
4
1.
88
1
1.
33
4
1.
16
4
1.
06
5
0.
95
8
0.
29
5
0.
41
8
0.
62
6
0.
82
8
0.
95
4
1.
03
6
T
o
T
ex
.o
il
1.
01
3
0.
98
0
1.
00
0
1.
02
5
1.
03
8
1.
06
9
1.
00
2
1.
01
8
1.
02
6
1.
03
0
1.
03
0
1.
02
7
C
B
O
&
T
o
T
ex
.
o
il
1.
02
9
1.
02
0∗
1.
08
3
1.
12
8
1.
11
4
1.
17
7
1.
15
3
0.
95
2
0.
85
3
0.
81
5
0.
82
8
0.
85
1
F
R
B
D
&
T
o
T
ex
.
o
il
0.
90
5∗
∗∗
0.
87
1∗
∗
0.
81
0∗
∗
0.
79
4∗
∗
0.
80
5∗
∗
0.
86
6∗
1.
39
3
0.
95
4∗
∗
0.
77
3∗
∗
0.
71
0∗
∗
0.
69
0∗
∗
0.
69
1∗
∗
IM
F
&
T
o
T
ex
.
o
il
1.
03
9
1.
00
9∗
1.
05
4
1.
07
6
1.
05
7
1.
12
0
1.
07
3
1.
12
5
1.
12
2
1.
09
6
1.
08
1
1.
07
6
O
E
C
D
&
T
o
T
ex
.
o
il
1.
02
1
1.
01
3∗
1.
07
6
1.
12
7
1.
11
4
1.
16
5
1.
02
6
0.
78
4∗
∗∗
0.
72
9∗
∗∗
0.
73
7∗
∗
0.
76
8∗
∗
0.
79
3∗
H
P
-ﬁ
lt
.&
T
o
T
ex
.
o
il
1.
02
3
1.
03
2
1.
09
2
1.
12
7
1.
10
6
1.
15
3
1.
10
3
0.
87
3∗
∗
0.
82
1∗
∗
0.
82
4∗
∗
0.
85
2∗
0.
87
2∗
U
S
M
o
n
ey
&
T
o
T
ex
.
o
il
1.
04
1
1.
02
7
1.
07
5
1.
13
7
1.
11
9
1.
15
9
1.
06
2
1.
06
8
1.
11
2
1.
14
4
1.
16
7
1.
19
4
G
7
M
o
n
ey
&
T
o
T
ex
.
o
il
1.
04
0
0.
88
3∗
∗
0.
93
7∗
∗
0.
99
0
0.
93
3∗
0.
92
8∗
1.
03
6
0.
96
6∗
0.
89
5∗
∗
0.
92
0∗
0.
96
0
0.
97
5
P
C
E
C
h
a
in
P
ri
ce
In
d
e
x
T
ri
m
m
e
d
M
e
a
n
P
C
E
P
ri
ce
In
d
e
x
A
R
2.
32
9
1.
19
0
0.
93
0
0.
88
5
0.
87
5
0.
89
9
0.
14
2
0.
16
9
0.
22
9
0.
31
3
0.
38
6
0.
43
6
T
o
T
ex
.o
il
1.
04
3
1.
03
6
1.
03
9
1.
06
5
1.
07
6
1.
08
3
1.
00
8
1.
04
5
1.
04
6
1.
04
7
1.
04
7
1.
04
0
C
B
O
&
T
o
T
ex
.
o
il
1.
05
7
1.
07
5
1.
08
0
1.
11
9
1.
09
6
1.
10
2
0.
96
8
0.
93
8
0.
93
6
0.
94
0
0.
96
6
0.
97
8
F
R
B
D
&
T
o
T
ex
.
o
il
0.
94
1∗
∗∗
0.
98
1∗
0.
93
8∗
0.
94
6
0.
94
3
0.
96
4
0.
92
5∗
∗∗
0.
90
7∗
∗
0.
85
4∗
∗
0.
84
3∗
∗
0.
85
0∗
∗
0.
83
1∗
IM
F
&
T
o
T
ex
.
o
il
1.
05
7
1.
05
3
1.
04
5
1.
07
6
1.
05
4
1.
06
5
1.
03
3
0.
95
4∗
∗
0.
88
6∗
∗
0.
86
9∗
∗
0.
86
0∗
∗
0.
85
5∗
O
E
C
D
&
T
o
T
ex
.
o
il
1.
05
2
1.
06
9
1.
07
1
1.
10
9
1.
08
3
1.
08
4
0.
91
3∗
∗∗
0.
84
1∗
∗
0.
87
2∗
∗
0.
90
3∗
0.
94
1∗
0.
96
4
H
P
-ﬁ
lt
.&
T
o
T
ex
.
o
il
1.
05
9
1.
07
7
1.
07
1
1.
10
8
1.
08
2
1.
08
3
0.
93
8∗
∗∗
0.
96
1∗
∗
0.
98
4∗
0.
98
7
1.
00
9
1.
00
6
U
S
M
o
n
ey
&
T
o
T
ex
.
o
il
1.
07
5
1.
07
3
1.
08
5
1.
13
6
1.
10
9
1.
16
5
0.
99
7
1.
12
7
1.
11
7
1.
12
7
1.
14
2
1.
13
9
G
7
M
o
n
ey
&
T
o
T
ex
.
o
il
1.
08
8
0.
94
2∗
∗
0.
98
0∗
0.
99
6
0.
91
5∗
0.
91
6∗
1.
05
5
1.
21
7
1.
36
4
1.
39
3
1.
41
4
1.
30
4
G
D
P
D
e
ﬂ
a
to
r
P
ro
d
u
ce
r
P
ri
ce
In
d
e
x
A
R
0.
50
8
0.
37
6
0.
42
3
0.
49
8
0.
54
5
0.
57
5
19
.4
31
7.
82
9
4.
72
4∗
3.
12
7
2.
20
7
1.
78
6
T
o
T
ex
.
o
il
0.
99
3
1.
06
1
1.
04
9
1.
05
6
1.
05
8
1.
06
3
1.
03
5
0.
98
1
0.
94
9
0.
98
2
1.
05
1
1.
15
2
C
B
O
&
T
o
T
ex
.
o
il
0.
91
7∗
∗∗
0.
81
9∗
∗
0.
88
6∗
∗
0.
97
0
1.
01
6
1.
05
7
1.
05
1
0.
98
8∗
0.
96
7∗
1.
01
2
1.
11
8
1.
22
4
F
R
B
D
&
T
o
T
ex
.
o
il
0.
89
1∗
∗∗
0.
89
5∗
∗
0.
92
0∗
0.
94
8∗
0.
97
6
0.
99
9
1.
07
8
1.
04
7∗
1.
03
3∗
1.
08
9
1.
19
1
1.
29
3
IM
F
&
T
o
T
ex
.
o
il
1.
01
3
1.
09
3
1.
07
3
1.
05
5
1.
05
2
1.
06
4
1.
07
0
1.
01
0∗
0.
99
2∗
1.
05
3∗
1.
17
3
1.
30
6
O
E
C
D
&
T
o
T
ex
.
o
il
0.
88
1∗
∗∗
0.
77
9∗
∗∗
0.
85
8∗
∗
0.
95
5∗
1.
00
7
1.
04
7
1.
03
9
0.
96
3∗
0.
93
5∗
0.
97
7
1.
07
3
1.
15
3
H
P
-ﬁ
lt
.&
T
o
T
ex
.
o
il
0.
91
7∗
∗∗
0.
87
4∗
∗
0.
92
5∗
0.
99
1
1.
04
3
1.
07
9
1.
04
4
0.
98
5
0.
96
5
1.
03
1
1.
15
1
1.
27
1
U
S
M
o
n
ey
&
T
o
T
ex
.
o
il
1.
00
0
1.
11
0
1.
09
9
1.
10
6
1.
10
8
1.
12
5
1.
08
2
0.
99
7∗
0.
95
9∗
1.
02
4
1.
12
8
1.
24
9
G
7
M
o
n
ey
&
T
o
T
ex
.
o
il
0.
98
8∗
1.
04
2
1.
03
8
1.
03
7
1.
02
2
1.
02
6
1.
10
9
0.
96
7∗
∗
0.
93
0∗
∗
0.
99
1∗
1.
08
6
1.
16
2
T
ab
le
B
.4
:
B
en
ch
m
ar
k
sa
m
pl
e
fo
re
ca
st
s
w
it
h
do
m
es
ti
c
va
ri
ab
le
s
an
d
te
rm
s
of
tr
ad
e
ex
.
oi
l
S
e
e
th
e
n
o
te
in
th
e
p
re
v
io
u
s
ta
b
le
.
99
Figure B.1: Time series plots of the data
100
Figure B.2: Evolution of the relative MSFEs of the forecasts with the US vs. G7 money
growth 101
Figure B.3: Evolution of the relative MSFEs of the forecasts with the US vs. G7 money
growth 102
Figure B.4: Evolution of the relative MSFEs of the forecasts with the CBO US slack vs.
OECD Total slack 103
Figure B.5: Evolution of the relative MSFEs of the forecasts with the CBO US slack vs.
OECD Total slack 104
Figure B.6: Evolution of the relative MSFEs of the forecasts with terms of trade vs. terms
of trade ex. oil 105
Figure B.7: Evolution of the relative MSFEs of the forecasts with terms of trade vs. terms
of trade ex. oil 106
Figure B.8: Model's prediction of the relative MSFEs of forecasts with domestic slack -
good luck 107
Figure B.9: Model's prediction of the relative MSFEs of forecasts with global slack - good
luck 108
Figure B.10: Model's prediction of the relative MSFEs of forecasts with HP-ﬁltered ToT
- good luck 109
Figure B.11: Model's prediction of the relative MSFEs of forecasts with ToT gap- good
luck 110
Figure B.12: Model's prediction of the relative MSFEs of forecasts with domestic money-
good luck 111
Figure B.13: Model's prediction of the relative MSFEs of forecasts with global money -
good luck 112
Figure B.14: Comparison of the forecasting performances of simulated domestic and global
output gap - good luck 113
Figure B.15: Comparison of the forecasting performances of simulated HP-ﬁltered ToT
and ToT gap - good luck 114
Figure B.16: Comparison of the forecasting performances of simulated domestic and global
money - good luck 115
Figure B.17: Model's prediction of the relative MSFEs of forecasts with domestic slack -
good luck (asymmetric) 116
Figure B.18: Model's prediction of the relative MSFEs of forecasts with global slack -
good luck (asymmetric) 117
Figure B.19: Model's prediction of the relative MSFEs of forecasts with HP-ﬁltered ToT
- good luck (asymmetric) 118
Figure B.20: Model's prediction of the relative MSFEs of forecasts with ToT gap- good
luck (asymmetric) 119
Figure B.21: Model's prediction of the relative MSFEs of forecasts with domestic money
- good luck (asymmetric) 120
Figure B.22: Model's prediction of the relative MSFEs of forecasts with global money -
good luck (asymmetric) 121
Figure B.23: Comparison of the forecasting performances of simulated domestic and global
output gap - good luck (asymmetric) 122
Figure B.24: Comparison of the forecasting performances of simulated HP-ﬁltered ToT
and ToT gap - good luck (asymmetric) 123
Figure B.25: Comparison of the forecasting performances of simulated domestic and global
money- good luck (asymmetric) 124
Figure B.26: Model's prediction of the relative MSFEs of forecasts with domestic slack -
monetary policy (low inertia) 125
Figure B.27: Model's prediction of the relative MSFEs of forecasts with global slack -
monetary policy (low inertia) 126
Figure B.28: Model's prediction of the relative MSFEs of forecasts with HP-ﬁltered ToT
- monetary policy (low inertia) 127
Figure B.29: Model's prediction of the relative MSFEs of forecasts with ToT gap - mon-
etary policy (low inertia) 128
Figure B.30: Model's prediction of the relative MSFEs of forecasts with domestic money-
monetary policy (low inertia) 129
Figure B.31: Model's prediction of the relative MSFEs of forecasts with global money-
monetary policy (low inertia) 130
Figure B.32: Comparison of the forecasting performances of simulated domestic and global
output gap - monetary policy (low inertia) 131
Figure B.33: Comparison of the forecasting performances of simulated HP-ﬁltered ToT
and ToT gap - monetary policy (low inertia)132
Figure B.34: Comparison of the forecasting performances of simulated domestic and global
money- monetary policy (low inertia) 133
Figure B.35: Model's prediction of the relative MSFEs of forecasts with domestic slack -
monetary policy (high inertia) 134
Figure B.36: Model's prediction of the relative MSFEs of forecasts with global slack -
monetary policy (high inertia) 135
Figure B.37: Model's prediction of the relative MSFEs of forecasts with HP-ﬁltered ToT
- monetary policy (high inertia) 136
Figure B.38: Model's prediction of the relative MSFEs of forecasts with ToT gap - mon-
etary policy (high inertia) 137
Figure B.39: Model's prediction of the relative MSFEs of forecasts with domestic money-
monetary policy (high inertia) 138
Figure B.40: Model's prediction of the relative MSFEs of forecasts with global money-
monetary policy (high inertia) 139
Figure B.41: Comparison of the forecasting performances of simulated domestic and global
output gap - monetary policy (high inertia)140
Figure B.42: Comparison of the forecasting performances of simulated HP-ﬁltered ToT
and ToT gap - monetary policy (high inertia)141
Figure B.43: Comparison of the forecasting performances of simulated domestic and global
money- monetary policy (high inertia) 142
Figure B.44: Model's prediction of the relative MSFEs of forecasts with domestic slack -
openness 143
Figure B.45: Model's prediction of the relative MSFEs of forecasts with global slack -
openness 144
Figure B.46: Model's prediction of the relative MSFEs of forecasts with HP-ﬁltered ToT
- openness 145
Figure B.47: Model's prediction of the relative MSFEs of forecasts with ToT gap - open-
ness 146
Figure B.48: Model's prediction of the relative MSFEs of forecasts with domestic money-
openness 147
Figure B.49: Model's prediction of the relative MSFEs of forecasts with global money-
openness 148
Figure B.50: Comparison of the forecasting performances of simulated domestic and global
output gap - openness 149
Figure B.51: Comparison of the forecasting performances of simulated HP-ﬁltered ToT
and ToT gap - openness 150
Figure B.52: Comparison of the forecasting performances of simulated domestic and global
money- openness 151
Figure B.53: Correlations of (i) model-consistent domestic output gap and HP-ﬁltered
domestic output, (ii) model-consistent global output gap and HP-ﬁltered global output, (iii)
model-consistent ToT gap and HP-ﬁltered ToT as a function of the parameters of good luck
(symmetric experiment)
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Figure B.54: Correlations of (i) model-consistent domestic output gap and HP-ﬁltered
domestic output, (ii) model-consistent global output gap and HP-ﬁltered global output, (iii)
model-consistent ToT gap and HP-ﬁltered ToT as a function of the parameters of good luck
(asymmetric experiment)
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Figure B.55: Correlations of (i) model-consistent domestic output gap and HP-ﬁltered
domestic output, (ii) model-consistent global output gap and HP-ﬁltered global output, (iii)
model-consistent ToT gap and HP-ﬁltered ToT as a function of the parameters of monetary
policy (high inertia)
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Figure B.56: Correlations of (i) model-consistent domestic output gap and HP-ﬁltered
domestic output, (ii) model-consistent global output gap and HP-ﬁltered global output, (iii)
model-consistent ToT gap and HP-ﬁltered ToT as a function of the parameters of monetary
policy (low inertia)
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Figure B.57: Correlations of (i) model-consistent domestic output gap and HP-ﬁltered
domestic output, (ii) model-consistent global output gap and HP-ﬁltered global output, (iii)
model-consistent ToT gap and HP-ﬁltered ToT as a function of the parameters of openness
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